Argument 1: "Low fertility makes the population older and smaller than it would otherwise be, with adverse consequences for our welfare"
This is possibly the most commonly voiced concern. With persistently low fertility there will for many years be a smaller number of children and adolescents relative to the working-age population than in a situation with higher fertility, while the proportion of older people relative to the working-age population will remain unchanged or only increase slightly. This may be an economic advantage. However, further into the future the sum of the number of young and number of old relative to the working-age population will be high compared to a higher-fertility scenario.
In other words, there will be fewer working-age persons for each person who is not working because of being children or old. This may make it more challenging to maintain production per person in the population and meet the demand for health care and other services for the old. Fortunately, steps may be taken to mitigate the problems. For example, the retirement age may be increased, and special initiatives to boost productivity may be introduced.
While there is extensive literature on the economic effects of age structure changes, less attention has been given to population size. It is far from clear that having a smaller population compared to the higher-fertility situation – and perhaps even experiencing population decline – will be an economic disadvantage. From an environmental perspective, a smaller population would likely be beneficial, as it would require less consumption of natural resources and less emission of greenhouse gases and pollutants.
This type of argument may be called an ‘aggregate-level’ or ‘externality’ argument, as the idea is that having few or no children has implications for others in society – in this case through the population size and age structure. Is it possible that low fertility also has adverse implications for the individuals or the families themselves? This leads us to the following three arguments:
Argument 2: "People who want to have, and do have, few or no children might be better off if they had more children"
The idea is that, when people make decisions about whether to have a child, or an additional child, they take into account how they expect the child to influence their lives, for better and worse. The reality may be quite different. At a higher age, some people may think that the child has given them more pleasures than anticipated, and may even regret not having tried to have more children, while others draw the opposite conclusion.
If the first group is the largest, one may argue that people on average would have been better off with more children than they had. However, although recent Norwegian data suggest that some women have regrets about not having had more children, there is little solid evidence to support the view that people tend to underestimate the value of parenthood and would have been better off with a larger family. Also, if such evidence existed, it is not clear how it could be used by politicians or individuals making decisions in their own life.
While this individual-level argument is rarely heard, the following is presented, or at least alluded to, quite often:
Argument 3: "Many people who have decided to have few or no children actually wanted or dreamed of having a larger family, which may cause frustration and unhappiness"
Clearly, people’s lives may become different from what they expect or imagine when they form their fertility desires – or are asked about these desires in surveys. They may, for example, encounter unforeseen economic problems, they may struggle with health issues, or they may not find or keep a partner. The gap between their desired fertility and the number of children they decide to have, given how their life has turned out, may be reduced by, for example, childrearing subsidies.
However, other people have other desires or dreams that are equally important to them and that remain unfulfilled. Unless there are special externality effects of childbearing such as just mentioned, it is far from obvious that we should give priority to helping meet desires about children in particular.
The third individual-level argument is the following:
Argument 4: "Having few or no children can be a great burden to individuals if they intended to have more children, but were unable to conceive or carry a pregnancy to term"
One policy response could be to make fertility treatment more easily available and affordable, through public funding. Another response could be to increase public awareness about how much the ability to have a baby decreases with age.
A combined individual-level and externality argument is also relevant in principle, although it is rarely heard in the debates on low fertility:
Argument 5: "Having few or no children has implications for the parents’ and children’s lives that in turn influence the broader society adversely"
For example, having few or no children may weaken adults’ health, and only children may be less well socialized than those who have siblings. This may in turn influence society through higher healthcare costs and otherwise. However, it is difficult to establish strong evidence about the impact of having children on the lives of parents and children, and about how this impact may have further implications for society. Furthermore, if solid evidence existed, it is not clear how it could be translated into effective policy.
Finally, one may take an entirely different perspective and claim the following:
Argument 6: "Low fertility is a result of factors that themselves are problematic"
More specifically, the idea is that it is not low fertility itself – or the difference between low fertility and the higher desired or intended fertility – that has a negative impact on society or individuals. Rather, low fertility is a consequence of characteristics of individuals and society that are problematic in their own due to their broadly adverse consequences.
For example, many people may choose to have a smaller family because of a low income and uncertainty about future earnings. Clearly, such an economic situation reduces individuals’ well-being in many ways. If policies aimed at improving the economic situation in relevant groups are implemented and successful, fertility may increase, but this would be unintentional.
It is important to note, however, that the decision to have a small family may be primarily a result of lifestyle choices rather than socioeconomic circumstances. For example, some people may have a particularly strong enthusiasm for spending money and time on certain luxury items or exciting leisure activities rather than childrearing. This is not necessarily a ‘problem’ itself. Furthermore, low fertility is partly a consequence of widely appreciated and desirable societal changes, such as expansion of education, particularly among women.
This distinction between six different types of arguments – some of which are well-known while others are rarely or quite vaguely presented – may help make future discussions about responses to low fertility better structured, clearer and broader. A substantive take-home message in one sentence could be: There are indeed good reasons for concern about low fertility, but it is perhaps, in total, less of a ‘problem’ than many seem to believe.