Similar but Different

Inclusion and Exclusion of Immigrant Communities Sharing Similar Cultural Backgrounds with Their Host Societies

Edited by Aimie Bouju and Andreas Edel
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Introduction

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Social cohesion and cultural integration of immigrants is a recurrent topic in most public discourses in European countries (Algan et al., 2012). The persistent discussion about a dominant, guiding culture in Germany (the so-called Leitkultur-Debatte) or the French debate on the nature of secularism and the challenges of Islam (débats sur la Laïcité) are just some examples. In those debates, different cultural traditions, languages and/or religious affiliations have often been mentioned as hindrances for the integration of immigrants, suggesting that divergent values and traditions make it more difficult to acculturate in a host society. While cultural distance with the host society is assumed to be an obstacle towards integration, it is also widely believed that individuals who share a similar cultural background with local natives would integrate more smoothly and swiftly into host societies. This view – implicitly supported by assimilation theories – has dominated, for instance, much of the sociological thinking in the 20th century (Alba and Nee, 1997). Even if scientific evidence suggests nowadays much more nuanced perspectives and lead to the development of alternative approaches, this presumption is still at the very heart of public debate and integration policies (Schneider and Crul, 2010).

This discussion paper seeks to put this claim to the test. By analysing the integration process of immigrant groups in different national contexts, it puts into question the extent to which similar cultural backgrounds influence the integration of immigrants in the receiving society. Is the integration of culturally close or similar migrants into the new environment “easier” than the integration of other immigrant groups? Or do the former face similar difficulties and disadvantages as the latter? The answer might seem evident at first glance and we may think that “closeness” may have a greater impact on their integration chances. This discussion paper will highlight that overall acceptance regarding ethnically closed migrants does not always match with better integration levels.

This discussion paper adopts a cross-national and interdisciplinary approach. First, it seems relevant to compare diverse aspects of integration processes in selected countries with distinct immigration experiences, political developments and ethnic minorities. Each country has established its own migratory system defined by pull and push economic factors, but also by legislation, cultural and historical links (Haas, 2007; Massey et al., 1998). The cross-national perspective allows one to ask whether particular patterns of integration are recurrent in different contexts. Second, contributions from various disciplines permit an analysis of integration processes under different perspectives, revealing the multifaceted mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion of immigrants in their host societies. The phenomena of exclusion can be highlighted by socio-economic indicators, but may also be identified using ethnological or historical perspectives.

For this purpose, this discussion paper analysed three different scenarios: 1) Migrants originated from “broken” communities after a dissolution of the political entity they have been living in over centuries, such as German expellees in West Germany after 1945 (Soňa Mikulová) and Canada (Pascal Maeder), ethnic Hungarians migrating to Hungary (Attila Melegh and Attila Papp Z.) and refugees who migrated after the partition of India and Pakistan (Deepra Dandekar); 2) the situation of immigrants in multi-ethnic communities who share some cultural traditions with the majority of the population in the country of destination due to their common colonial past, for instance in the United Kingdom (Laurence Lessard-Phillips), France (Tatiana Eremenko), Spain (Andreu Domingo i Valls) and Portugal (João Sardinha); 3) societies where ethnic diversity has been a less pronounced obstacle on the way to integration due to an overarching concept of social cohesion, such as the socialist notion of transnational solidarity within the “working class” like Russians in Bulgaria (Anna Krasteva) and migrants from the former USSR in the Russian Federation (Paul
Becker). In this way, this discussion paper will show that even under “optimal” conditions with regard to aspects like bilingualism, shared cultural traditions and narratives, as well as similar religious beliefs, the pathway to inclusion is not necessarily any smoother.

This discussion paper received funding from the project “The Challenges of Migration, Integration and Exclusion. Wissenschaftsinitiative Migration der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (WiMi Project)”, financed by the Max Planck Society. This project seeks to put a strong focus on patterns and mechanisms of exclusion.

References


Introduction: The UK as a country of immigration?

Migration, or individuals’ “permanent or semipermanent change of residence” (Lee 1966, 49), has always been an important feature of population dynamics for the United Kingdom (UK), be it, for example, from conflict, settlement, trade, movement of UK citizens and subjects, free movement of EU citizens, movement of refugees and asylum seekers, or more regulated immigration. According to official statistics, despite these historical trends, up until the 1990s the UK was a country of emigration rather than immigration (Office for National Statistics 2016a), with empire-building and consolidating, as well as economic circumstances, among others, leading to more people, quite often UK citizens, leaving the country, rather than entering (Hatton & Wheatley Price 2005). Recent net migration figures highlight how the outflow continues to be sizeable, but outnumbered by the significant increase of inflow. Concerns with the movement and settlement of individuals not born within the geographical boundaries of the UK, especially if ethnically different from the “mainstream” white British population, and regardless of their entitlements to enter and remain, have almost always taken centre stage in the UK’s political and public spheres. If we focus on the post-war period, this can be seen, among others, in speeches by Powell and Jenkins in the 1960s (Jenkins 1967; Powell 1968), opposition to immigration and multiculturalism (Ford 2011; Taylor-Gooby & Waite 2014), discussions about social integration (All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Integration 2017; Casey 2016) and debates about “EU immigration” in the run-up to the EU Referendum (Prosser, Mellon & Green 2016).

One central and recurring feature of post-war debates and policies around this topic concerns postcolonial migration. This is linked more specifically to the rejection and/or acceptance of postcolonial “migrants” from the “Old” and “New” Commonwealth (see text box) as economically, socially and culturally viable for the UK (Joppke 2005). A recurring narrative has been that of “patriality”: The differentiation between “wanted” (usually from the Old Commonwealth) and “unwanted” (usually from the New Commonwealth) has followed a “patrial” line, where preference has been historically granted to individuals from the Old (white) Commonwealth and opposition to “migration” from the New (ethnic minority) Commonwealth has been strong.

Patrial tendencies are also present in the inclusion of Commonwealth citizens in education and the labour market, which do not always disappear over time and follow strong ethnic lines.

It might be worth reconsidering the lens through which the inclusion of the Old Commonwealth should be explored.
monwealth) migrants based on ancestry linked to the UK, and, by and large, ethnic differentiation and racial hierarchical preference (Hansen 2000, Joppke 2005, Miles 1991).

Thus, the question that is posed in this contribution is whether this patrilineal link reproduces itself beyond the political and public debates and into the educational and economic structures of the UK, or whether shared institutional background facilitates inclusion. One could argue that shared background through Commonwealth affiliation should, in theory, facilitate the integration of Commonwealth “migrants”. Yet, the main answer, which should not come as a surprise, is that the patrilineal link remains, especially in the labour market. This contribution, via a review of the existing literature, will outline the areas of inclusion and exclusion for Old and New Commonwealth “migrants” and attempt to investigate which factors may, or may not, explain this. First, however, we delve a bit further into the context characterising the patterns and policies governing the movement of Commonwealth “migrants” to the UK.

Commonwealth citizens in the UK: Patterns and policy

Estimates of the movement of people born in Commonwealth countries in and out of the UK (see Figure 1) show that, in the last three decades, net migration has been generally positive (more people in-migrating than out-migrating). Especially since the 1990s and early 2000s, the positive trends of New Commonwealth net migration tend to follow that of other groups, such as people born in the EU or other countries.

![Figure 1: Estimates of net migration to the UK, 1975-2015, by country of birth](http://example.com/figure1.png)

This has occurred despite continued attempts to restrict the legal rights and entitlements of Commonwealth citizens to move and settle in the UK during that period.

Without going into too much detail (see, e.g., work by Solomos (1989), Hansen (2000) and Hampshire (2005) for more), the policies regulating the entry and settlement of Commonwealth citizens have greatly changed in the post-war period, steering away from a dependence on the Commonwealth and toward the European Community and the European

| Old Commonwealth |
| New Commonwealth |
| Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa* | Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas (The), Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Botswana, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Overseas, British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Cameroon, Cayman Islands, Christmas Island, Cocos Island, Cook Island, ex Cyprus*** / Southern Cyprus**** / Northern Cyprus, Dominica, Falkland Islands / British Antarctic, Gambia (The)**, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati (and other Pacific Islands), Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta****, Mauritius, Montserrat, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue Island, Norfolk Island, Pacific Islands (including Palau), Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn Island, Rwanda***, Western Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, Sri Lanka, St Helena / Ascension / Tristan da Cunha, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna Islands, Zambia, Zimbabwe**.

Table 1: Old and New Commonwealth countries.
Notes: *Often not included in Old Commonwealth in published research. **Withdrew from the Commonwealth, but still included in that category. ***Admitted to the Commonwealth in 2009, so excluded from most statistics. ****Included as EU since 2004 Accession.
Union (Spencer 2002). In more recent years, this also included reframing views of (non-EU) migrants along economic lines (Mulvey 2011). This has had the impact of re-labelling Commonwealth citizens, especially from the New Commonwealth, from British subjects to immigrants. The general narrative has been a “gradual” stripping of such rights and entitlements whilst keeping the advantages of paternal linkage embedded within new policies (Hansen 2000, Miles 1991).

Like many European countries in the post-war period, the UK was outward-looking when attempting to fill labour shortages. The advantage of it being a colonial power meant that important labour shortages, such as within the health system, were filled from (usually New) Commonwealth countries (Raghuram & Kofman 2002). However, in the face of economic, political and public backlash, as well as more reliance on EU workers, rights of access and settlement for Commonwealth citizens became more and more restricted and tied to prior links to the UK, starting in the 1960s. Subsequent policies have sought to reduce various entitlements, especially with regard to settlement, citizenship acquisition (via the 1981 British Nationality Act), and family reunification. Yet, these policies exempted anyone with direct lineage to the UK (via, for example, emigrating parents or grandparents) from immigration control, hence ensuring the maintenance of the paternal link to the Old Commonwealth (Hansen 2000).

The inclusion of Commonwealth citizens and their descendants in education and work

Published research that identifies migrants from the Old/New Commonwealth in the field of education and work is quite rare, if not non-existent in the case of the latter. This may be due to the availability of existing data, or the reliance on more established measures of differentiation such as ethnicity. It is the case that identification with the Commonwealth in data sources is less and less common. The Labour Force Survey, often used for studies of inclusion in education and the labour market, has not used a Commonwealth-based classification of country of birth since 1991 (Office for National Statistics 2017a). Moreover, since 2015, the Office for National Statistics has discontinued many tables allowing the identification of Old and New Commonwealth “migrants” in their official immigration estimates (Office for National Statistics 2017b).

A more common occurrence is the use of self-reported ethnicity as a measure, which has been a variable in official statistics since the 1991 National Census (Jivraj 2012) and used in many surveys. The current ethnicity categories, which have been present (though changing) in every Census since it was established in 1991, are as follows (Office for National Statistics n.d.):

- **White**: Welsh / English / Scottish / Northern Irish / British, Irish, Gypsy or Irish Traveller, any other White background;
- **Mixed / Multiple ethnic groups**: White and Black Caribbean, White and Black African, White and Asian, any other Mixed / Multiple ethnic background;
- **Asian / Asian British**: Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, any other Asian background;
- **Black / African / Caribbean / Black British**: African, Caribbean, any other Black / African / Caribbean background; and
- **Other ethnic group**: Arab, any other ethnic group.

As can be seen, these different categories of ethnic groups are linked to colonial heritage and allow for differentiation between groups from the New Commonwealth. Although a well-established, well-criticised and often challenged measure (Bhambra 2007; Burton, Nandi & Platt 2010), self-reported ethnicity does not, however, allow to directly identify Old Commonwealth “migrants” in the data. These tend to be lumped in the “White Other” category (along with, among others, EU nationals who identify as white).
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</tr>
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Commonwealth citizens in education: Focus on ethnicity

When looking at research on education, affiliation to the Commonwealth is not used, whereas there is more research investigating migrant and/or ethnic educational inequalities, often interchangeably. Such research shows that there are varying levels of student performance according to migration status and ethnicity.\(^8\) It is the case, however, that not all research differentiates between ethnic minority individuals born in and outside of the UK (the latter being the focus of this essay). With regard to performance during compulsory schooling, which often focuses on the UK-born children of migrants, research shows lower, but at the same time improving, educational performance for ethnic minority pupils (Dustmann, Machin, & Schönberg 2010; Strand 2014). With regard to qualifications achieved, regardless of the measure used, the Indian, Black African and Chinese groups have the highest levels of educational attainment. The level of attainment is lower for the Pakistani group, whereas the Black Caribbean and Bangladeshi groups tend to exhibit the lowest levels of attainment, with some differences between men and women, and overall improvement across generations (Algan, Dustmann, Glitz & Manning 2010; Lessard-Phillips & Li 2017). There are also indications of over- and under-education, broadly following patterns of educational attainments (Battu & Sloane 2004; Lindley 2009).

Commonwealth citizens and the labour market: Presence of penalties

Contrary to educational research, there are some studies focusing on the differentiation between Old and New Commonwealth “migrants” when exploring inequalities in the labour market. Some of this research contrasts the labour market outcomes of Old Commonwealth groups to specific New Commonwealth groups, or differentiates between white migrants from the Old and New Commonwealth. The bulk of the research on inequalities in the labour market does, however, focus on the performance of ethnic groups, just as in the sphere of education. Here I focus on the former. Overall, such research shows negative effects that are stratified along paternal lines: Whereas “migrants” from the Old Commonwealth exhibit positive or similar performance in the labour market (with regard to, for example, participation, employment and earnings) compared to the “native” British-born, there are some important negative differences for “migrants” from the New Commonwealth. Participation rates tend to be lower for New Commonwealth migrants, but this changes during the time spent in the country (Demireva 2011; Dustmann & Fabbri 2005).

In terms of employment (Clark & Lindley 2009; Demireva 2011; Demireva & Kesler 2011; Dustmann & Fabbri 2005), there are some positive effects, especially for white “migrants” from the Old and New Commonwealth with increased time spent in the UK. White Commonwealth “migrants” have greater initial advantages, particularly if they arrived in the UK as students or have language fluency. The initial disadvantages experienced by minority New Commonwealth “migrants” do not, however, always disappear over time. Patterns appear to repeat themselves in the second generation (Demireva & Kesler 2011) and language proficiency appears to have a positive effect on employment outcomes (Dustmann & Fabbri 2003, who investigated this without using a Commonwealth angle). With regard to earnings (Bell 1997; Clark & Lindley 2009; Dustmann & Fabbri 2005), “migrants” from the New Commonwealth, especially from the Caribbean, have the strongest disadvantage, which decreases, but remains throughout their career, whereas Old Commonwealth immigrants have a wage advantage that tends to converge toward that of the UK-born over time. Regarding job quality, self-employment rates are higher among all “migrant” groups, and New Commonwealth “migrants”, especially men, are less likely to have high quality occupations (Demireva 2011; Dustmann & Fabbri 2005).

Conclusions

As we can see above, the research orientations, as well as patterns of differentiation in education and the labour market, follow ethnic lines, which indirectly concern “migrants” from the New Commonwealth, but does not allow for an assessment of the inclusion of Old Commonwealth migrants. What we tend to see are patterns of high educational attainments, with some variation, but disadvantage in the labour market as a common story for ethnic minority groups that sometimes, but not always, disappears over time. When the differentiation is possible, which is the case for work focusing on the labour market, patterns of inequality based on patriality emerge, especially with regard to the advantage of Old Com-
monwealth "migrants". One may assume that a country’s colonial past would equip citizens of said country with a shared background that facilitates their inclusion in the host society. In the case of the UK, this does not appear to be the case.

A question that emerges from these results is whether other "shared" characteristics such as language, religion, length of stay and citizenship play a role. Existing research that engages with this shows some improvement when such measures are included, but inequalities tend to remain. There thus seem to be persisting ethnic inequalities in terms of the inclusion of Commonwealth “migrants” in the education and labour market structures of the UK. Issues of attitudes toward Commonwealth “migrants”, especially with regard to the New Commonwealth, which can be based on ethnic prejudice and discrimination, should be explored in more detail. Another issue that needs further thought is whether migrants from the Old Commonwealth are considered migrants in legal, social and political terms. Given the fact that most of them are descendants of individuals emigrating from the UK, this may require the exploration of their inclusion through a different lens.

Footnotes

1 This definition implies that children of migrants, or the second generation (Lessard-Phillips, Galandini, de Valk, & Fibbi, 2017) are not included in this discussion.

2 For an interactive description of migration to the UK, see https://www.ourmigrationstory.org.uk/.

3 Here I use the term migrant as an individual having established their place of residence in the UK, regardless of their legal imperative to do so.

4 These are estimates taken from the International Passenger Survey.

5 Note that the confidence intervals provided with the estimates are not included here; caution is required when comparing lines.

6 The recent "Windrush scandal", which occurred after this contribution was written, can be linked to this narrative.

7 It is, however, still possible to classify individuals manually.

8 Note that not all research is reviewed here except for papers that are indicative of results from the broader field.

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Dustmann, C. & Fabbri, F. (2003). Language Proficiency and


Prosser, C., Mellon, J. & Green, J. (2016). What Mattered Most to You When Deciding How to Vote in the EU Referen-


Introduction: Migration from Africa at the centre of public debates

Immigration has been a permanent feature of French society since the 19th century. Initially the recruitment of workers from neighbouring European countries, and later colonial territories, was seen as necessary to compensate for labour shortages, especially during and in the aftermath of both World Wars. However, each time economic growth slowed down, policies were adopted that were aimed at restricting the entry, stay and work of foreigners (Borrel 1999). Legal routes for work migration were restricted beginning in the 1960s. Since then migration flows have diversified in terms of migration motives (family ties, asylum, studies) and national origins (Bouvier 2012).

Immigration and the integration of persons with a migrant background are topics constantly present in public debates in France. These issues have been at the top of the government’s agenda, with legal reforms taking place every couple of years since 1980. They are especially visible during electoral campaigns, particularly during the campaign which led to the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as President in 2007. Most of these debates concern postcolonial migration flows, primarily from the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa. The focus on the difficulties migrants and their descendants face in French society suggests the impossibility of a successful integration for these groups as compared to previous waves of migrants – from Southern Europe, for example – due in part to cultural differences. This situation may seem surprising given the historical ties between the countries of origin and France, a shared cultural background and a common language in the case of some of the migrants. In this context, it is useful to reconsider to what extent these ties with former colonies from Africa have shaped migration flows and migrants’ experiences in France and have set the foundations for both advantages, but also obstacles they face in French society. To answer this question, I examine the position of these migrants in three areas: Their prospects of acquiring a stable legal status, a prerequisite for participation in other areas; their educational levels and labour market outcomes; and the role of the French language in their migration and integration process.
Postcolonial flows: A diversity of situations, difficult to apprehend with existing data sources

The initiation and evolution of migration flows from Africa to France is linked to its colonial past. The French colonial empire covered three continents before its decomposition following the independence of Indochina (1954), Algeria (1962) and Sub-Saharan African countries in the 1960s. Morocco and Tunisia were previously French protectorates, but also gained their full independence in this period (1956). However, for a long time, relations between the independent states and the former metropole remained close in many areas: Politically, militarily, economically. In addition, French continues to be the official language or is widely used in many of the countries: It is spoken by around 274 million people\(^2\), their geographical distribution reflecting that of the former French colonial empire (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, OIF 2014).

Migrants from these countries have distinct migratory histories towards the former metropole. The arrival of nationals from Indochina is concentrated in time (between 1975 and 1983) and primarily composed of refugees (Beauchemin et al. 2015b). Algerian migration to France has a longer history and more diversified flows (workers and their families, but also persons fleeing persecution at the end of the 20th century) (Zehraoui 2003). Migration from Sub-Saharan Africa pre-dates the independence of these countries, with initial flows from present-day Senegal, later followed by Mali and Mauritania, and important diversification in the last decades in terms of origins and profiles (workers and their families, students, asylum seekers) (Barou 2011). Since the start of the 21st century, migration from the African continent, more precisely from Sub-Saharan Africa, has progressed at a more rapid rate than for the rest of the immigrant population (Table 1): Whereas the total immigrant population increased by 36% between 1999 and 2014, it more than doubled for those from Sub-Saharan Africa as a group and from countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon. However, it is important to note that this group continues to represent a minority of immigrants in France (14% of the total). The Maghreb remains one of the most numerous region of origin (30%), similar in size with that of Europe (32%, not in table).

To what extent do existing statistics provide information on describing characteristics and outcomes of migrants from former colonies? Whereas data sources (administrative sources, statistical surveys) often collect primary information that makes it possible to identify these migrants (based on their nationality and/or country of birth), published statistics generally do not use categories referring to former colonial history, making it difficult, if not impossible, to identify them. Historically, statistics have used categories related only to nationality, and have distinguished between “French” and “foreigners”. The concept of “immigrant” – a person who is born a foreigner and abroad, and resides in France – was adopted by the High Council for Integration in 1991 and gradually introduced in official statistics since this time (population census, statistical surveys) (Héran 2002).\(^3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>% Ch</th>
<th>Increase in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>1,298,499</td>
<td>1,761,284</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>575,749</td>
<td>773,742</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>521,059</td>
<td>721,903</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>201,700</td>
<td>265,549</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>392,611</td>
<td>833,033</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>53,894</td>
<td>91,949</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>8,392</td>
<td>19,759</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>26,880</td>
<td>76,369</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camores</td>
<td>13,763</td>
<td>30,803</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>35,349</td>
<td>61,163</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. of the Congo</td>
<td>23,727</td>
<td>74,630</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>29,879</td>
<td>78,480</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>5,704</td>
<td>31,179</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>26,272</td>
<td>53,403</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>35,928</td>
<td>68,836</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>27,806</td>
<td>32,024</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>8,237</td>
<td>15,824</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African countries</td>
<td>95,786</td>
<td>197,904</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: Africa</td>
<td>1,692,110</td>
<td>2,594,287</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: All countries</td>
<td>4,308,527</td>
<td>5,848,314</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Estimates of immigrants from African countries living in France, 1999-2014.
Source: INSEE, Population census 1999 (table CD-N1), 2014 (table IMG1B).
Given their numbers, immigrants born in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are usually distinguished, although at times they are merged into one category. The National Statistical Institute (INSEE) in the past sometimes distinguished immigrants from countries having formerly been under French rule and those from other Sub-Saharan countries (for example, in the population census of 1999). However, this no longer appears to be the case and immigrants from all African countries other than Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are often grouped together without further distinctions (with some exceptions).

Surveys specifically targeting persons with an immigrant background, such as the Trajectories and Origins Survey (TeO 2008-2009) or the Longitudinal Survey of the Integration of First-time Arrivals (ELIPA 2010-2013), provide more detailed data in terms of national origins. Authors of the TeO study make a distinction between three groups of Sub-Saharan African countries in their analyses depending on their migratory history with France (Beauchemin et al. 2015a).

Statistics using ethnic and racial categories, such as those used in other "multicultural" societies like the United States or the United Kingdom, are non-existent in the French context. Although the categories of "race" and ethnicity are used in debates, and racism and racial discriminations are present in French society, "race" and ethnicity were never codified in France as categories in official statistics. Social sciences have also been reticent to introducing these categories in their analyses (Simon 2015).

Legal regime: Restrictive migration policies for all migrants

Understanding the migrants’ legal context of reception is important as it determines their ulterior outcomes. Legal status is increasingly being recognised as a basis for social stratification, and having an important impact on different areas of migrants’ lives, such as family relations or health. Migrants from former colonies have been coming to France under different legal regimes. Before independence, they were French subjects and could thus come and go freely. Many were actively recruited to come and work in France, although did not always have the same level of rights as other workers (for example, in terms of family benefits) (Math 1998). After their independence, some African states were able to negotiate more favourable legal agreements, particularly in terms of labour migration (Barou 2011). For example, nationals of some countries were not required to hold a visa until 1984 (Vickstrom 2014). However, these specific legal regimes were gradually aligned with the general one, which has in turn become more and more restrictive.

Migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries appear to be among those most affected by these policy changes. Of those migrants who received their first permanent residence permit, nationals from these countries (a majority of which were from Mali and Senegal) had the most complex and precarious migratory and administrative trajectories of all groups (Règnard & Domergues 2011). They were over-represented among migrants who had travelled through other countries (often due to the lack of documents allowing them to directly enter France), who had been in France for five or more years before being given permanent residency (often through regularisation for family or work reasons) and who had experienced greater difficulties in the prefectures while obtaining their residence permit. For those that had come directly to France within less than a year, a larger proportion of Sub-Saharan migrants had been refused a visa in the past compared to nationals of other origins. These findings are corroborated by another survey carried out among Sub-Saharan migrants in the greater Paris region showing that settlement in France (obtaining a permanent legal status, a personal dwelling and paid work) often took them many years (Gosselin et al. 2016).

Educational levels and labour market outcomes: A mismatch

Although stereotypes portray all immigrants as low educated, recent studies tell a more nuanced story and insist on the diversity of situations in terms of education among migrants. Migrants are generally “positively selected” among the origin population, meaning that their educational levels are higher than those of individuals who do not migrate, and this is equally the case in France (Jchou et al. 2017). In addition, specific flows have a higher proportion of individuals with a tertiary education than the native-born population (for example, in the case of a high presence of students or high-skilled migrants).

Indeed, migrants’ educational levels need to be understood with regard to their migratory trajectories.
Migrants from Northern Africa have lower educational levels than the majority population in France (Beauchemin et al. 2015b): This situation is due to an important proportion of older migrants who arrived many years ago and who have no education (around one out of seven adult immigrants from Algeria and Morocco living in France). Inversely, Sub-Saharan male migrants hold a tertiary degree more often than the majority population, due to the fact that many of them arrived in France as students (Moquérou et al. 2015). Around one-fourth of residence permits issued to Sub-Saharan nationals in France in the 2008-2015 period were for studies, and this proportion was even higher for specific countries: Benin (51%), Gabon (66%), Guinea (31%), Senegal (34%) (the corresponding proportion was 30% for all third country nationals).7

When turning to the labour market outcomes of migrants, evidence also points to different situations for migrants from Africa. Whereas activity rates are similar for all men, regardless of their immigrant status and origin, among women, participation in the labour market is low for Northern Africans (around one half are active), but higher among Sub-Saharans (INSEE 2012). However, all immigrants from Africa often experience higher levels of unemployment and when they do find work, it is often in lower-skilled occupations, primarily in the services sector, and with lower income (INSEE 2012; Brinbaum et al. 2015a; Meurs et al. 2015).

One of the reasons for the mismatch between the migrants’ qualifications and their occupations results from difficulties in transposing their human capital acquired abroad in the destination country. A study of the labour market trajectories of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa in Europe based on the MAPE surveya showed that a larger proportion of them were inactive or in low-skilled occupations after their arrival than prior to their departure, regardless of their educational levels (Castagnone et al. 2015). Acquiring educational resources in Europe was a determining factor for improving their labour market situation. However, it is also important to mention that immigrants of African origin and their descendants more often than other groups experience discrimination in different spheres, including in the labour market (Brinbaum et al. 2015b).

Language shapes international migration flows (Adsera & Pytlíková 2015) and has important (positive) consequences on migrants’ socio-economic integration, particularly labour market outcomes (Chiswick & Miller 2014). Currently, language is also an important factor in order to understand migration dynamics in France. Figure 1 compares the proportion of French speakers among the total population in the origin country and among recently arrived migrants in France. French speakers are over-represented among migrants, particularly among Sub-Saharan nationals. For example, in Mali, 17% of adults were French speakers, but among Malians in France, they represented more than a half (31% spoke French as children and 54% had received education in French). Among migrants in France, French speakers declared that speaking the language played just as an important role in their decision to come to France as having family or friends living there (these two factors were declared by around 50% of French speakers),

Figure 1: Proportion of French speakers among total population in country of origin and migrants in France by country (%).
Source: *OIF, 2014. **ELIPA. Author’s calculations.
in contrast to other migrants for which family and social ties were by far the most important reason for choosing France.

Does knowledge of French later translate into better socio-economic outcomes for the migrants involved? Contrary to other destination countries, this issue has not been widely addressed in the French context, in part due to the unavailability of statistical data on languages for a long time (Filhon 2016). Immigrants from African countries, particularly Sub-Saharan, do have a higher level of French than immigrants from other origins (Condon & Régnard 2015). A recent study using the Labour Force Survey (2014) showed that the command of the language did have a positive impact on employment, particularly in the first few years after arrival (Bechichi et al. 2016). The level of French was also crucial in understanding the income differences with non-immigrants. For immigrants who did not have an excellent command of the language, it was harder to value their education and experience, particularly for those with tertiary education.

However, this same study showed that immigrants from the Maghreb and other African countries (the two groups were not distinguished in the study) continued having worse outcomes than other groups, even after controlling for their language level. Thus, their better knowledge of French compared to other migrants did not always allow them to translate their human capital in the French context. This result raises the issue of the legitimacy of their linguistic resources in the context of migration (Martín Rojo & Marquez Reiter 2014). French spoken outside of mainland France, such as in the African countries studied in this paper, does differ from the “standard” French in terms of vocabulary and grammar (Fall 2010), as well as the accent. All these characteristics in conjunction with the position of the migrants in France may thus make it more difficult for them to use their linguistic resources. Indeed, accent and way of speaking is often declared as a reason for discrimination in different areas (work, housing, health) (Fundamental Rights Agency, FRA 2017).

Conclusion

France’s colonial past has shaped migration flows and migrants’ experiences at their destination, and will likely continue to do so in the near future. Factors such as historical ties and a shared cultural background (including the French language), as well as the existence of transnational family and social networks, have contributed to the initiation and continuation of migration from Maghreb and Sub-Saharan African countries to France. These factors would also suggest that upon arrival, migrants from these countries would have greater capabilities to integrate into the French society compared to other groups. Numerous studies in different destination countries point to the (usually) positive effects of language proficiency, social networks, prior information on the reception context on socio-economic outcomes. A shared cultural background and language could be even more important factors for a successful integration into the French context as these ideas are central to the concept of French identity (Raissiguier 2013).

However, an examination of African migrants’ positions in different areas, such as their legal and socio-economic integration, has shown that in many cases they face greater obstacles than other groups, and this is particularly true for Sub-Saharan migrants. Indeed, including when migrants have educational and linguistic resources, transposing their social and cultural capital is not always possible and they face poor legal and socio-economic prospects, thus blocking them from full participation in the reception society. Two factors of exclusion – restrictive migration policies and the presence of ethnic and racial discrimination – often acting together and reinforcing each other (Thomas 2013), appear to negatively affect African migrants’ integration prospects on a long-term basis.

Acknowledgments

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Footnotes

1 See, for example, the controversy around the book *The Denial of Cultures* by Hugues Lagrange that came out in 2010.

2 French speakers include native speakers, persons who received an education in French and persons who took French classes as a foreign language (OIF 2014).
3 The criteria of citizenship at birth was introduced to distinguish French citizens born abroad, of which French “re-patriates” from Algeria represent the largest group, from other migrants. When this information is unavailable, they are sometimes counted with other migrants (persons born abroad).

4 Countries formerly under French rule include Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Gabon, the Gambia, Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo.

5 The TeO survey was conducted in 2008-2009 by the National Statistical Institute (INED) and the National Institute for Demographic Studies (Ined). It is representative of the general population residing in ordinary households in mainland France, but over-samples persons with a migrant background (see Beauchemin et al. 2015a for more details).

6 The ELIPA survey was carried out among third country nationals who had been issued a permanent residence permit allowing them to settle in France and eligible for the signature of the Reception and Integration Contract (CAI) in 2009. It was conducted by the Statistical Department of the Directorate of Foreigners (DSED) in three waves (2010, 2011 and 2013) (see Régnard & Domergue 2011 for more details).

7 Source: Eurostat (table resfirst). Author’s calculations.

8 The MAFE project generated multi-sited, comparative and longitudinal surveys carried out in three African countries – Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Senegal – and six European countries – Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom (see Beauchemin & González-Ferrer 2011 for more details).

References


Selective Migration Policies in Spain

The Case of Latin Americans

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Introduction

Migratory flows are quickly increasing, which is part of the globalisation process. This has led to the discussion of the issue of selective migratory flows in the context of European Union migration policies again. Citing their colonial past, many countries have tended to prioritise selection that favoured citizens of their former colonies, either directly through migration policies (Bauböck 2010), or indirectly with preferential access to citizenship. This selection, justified by the argument that the immigrants have a shared origin with citizens, is presented as restitution for the "colonial debt", and recognition of a common language and history. It is also perceived as an efficient mechanism for inclusion, and as aiding social cohesion by taking ethnocultural affinities into account. Nevertheless, the criteria for belonging may clash with other principles pertaining to the individual situations of potential immigrants or certain aspects of EU migration policy.¹

Selective migratory policies implicitly assume that it is easier to integrate citizens of former colonies than citizens of other countries. However, ethnic selection has an impact on the entire integration process of all migrant groups, favoured or not. Examination of the paradigmatic case of Latin American immigrants in Spain may help to shed light on this question.

Latin American immigration in Spain in the 21st century

With the new millennium, Spain went from being a country of emigration to one of immigration with a remarkable rise in immigrants. Between 2000 and 2007, 4.9 million people entered the country, making Spain the EU's leading destination for immigrants from abroad (Pellegrino 2004), and second in the world after the United States (OECD 2007). Immigration from Latin America, with 1.8 million immigrants during this period, represents 37% of the total flow. Due to the economic crisis of 2008 and associated structural adjustment measures, the volume of immigration dropped by more than half (Figure 1). Emigration increased, partly with the return of immigrants to their countries of origin (some 940,000 Latin American people between 2008 and 2016), but also with re-emigration, which is to say emigration from Spain to third countries.

After 2014, the flow of Latin American immigrants to Spain rose again, almost doubling from 80,685 arrivals in 2013 to 157,790 in 2016. These recent figures are probably more related to push factors in the countries of origin – political crisis (Venezuela and Colombia), citizen insecurity (Honduras and El Salvador) and economic crisis (Argentina) – than...
with pull factors in Spain. In all, some three million immigrants came to Spain from Latin America between 2000 and 2016 (almost a third of the 9.4 million arrivals from abroad), most of them of working age, 28.7-years-old on average, and 54.5% of them women attracted by the opportunities in the service sector, especially as domestic workers and carers of young children and the elderly.

### Political and legal factors

Explanations of the increased number of immigrants from Latin America must take into account three kinds of favourable legislative measures: Access to citizenship through residence, regularisation and recruitment campaigns, and recognition of Spanish nationality for descendants of former Spanish emigrants.

First and foremost, one must consider the role of positive discrimination in accessing Spanish nationality. This goes back to 1954 and the Franco dictatorship, and is related to the notion of *Hispanidad* ("spanishness"), which suggests a pan-national community with a shared colonial legacy, language, history (and religion), although, at the time, the main feature of the migratory reality was Spanish emigration to Latin America. The legal provisions came with bilateral agreements on dual nationality with 13 Latin American countries from 1958 to 1979 (Mateos 2015). The law was ratified with the 1990 Reform of the Civil Code. Once ratified, immigrants from these countries only needed to provide proof that they had lived in Spain as a legal resident, uninterrupted, for two years in order to acquire Spanish nationality. Other immigrants, in comparison, were required to reside in Spain for ten years. As a result of this discrimination, Latin American immigrants far outnumber other immigrants in terms of naturalisation: 72.5% of a total of 1.3 million nationalisations from 2000 to 2016 were granted to citizens of Latin American countries (see Figure 2) (Domingo i Valls and Ortega-Rivera 2015).

Since the economic crisis, which has caused a sharp rise in the demand for Spanish citizenship by immigrants from all origins, the two-year residence requirement has meant that 88.7% of applications by Latin Americans for naturalisation have been successful, a figure far above the 9.2% for people who have married Spaniards and the 1.2% born in Spain. Hence, of the 2.3 million people from Latin America residing in Spain in 2016, 1.26 million (55%) had Spanish nationality (Figure 3), representing no less than 64% of all foreign-born residents with Spanish nationality.

![Figure 2: Granting of Spanish citizenship, by continent, 2000 - 2016. Source: Compiled by author, Ministry of Employment and Social Security. Permanent Immigration Observatory. 2000-2016.](image2.png)

![Figure 3: Pyramid of the Latin American population residing in Spain by place of birth and citizenship, 2016. Source: Population Register (INE).](image3.png)

Also significant are the measures taken since 2000: From 2000 to 2004, the conservative government obtained an absolute majority, which led to a change in the direction of migration policy. Although
the policy was notable for its opacity, statements by members of the government and, in particular, the new State Secretary for Migration, signalled a preference for immigrants from Latin America over other countries of origin and, moreover, a project of ethnic substitution replacing migrants from other countries, especially Moroccans – then the most numerous group of foreigners residing in Spain – with citizens of Latin American countries (Joppke 2005). Extraordinary mass regularisation of the status of immigrants (2000, 2001 and 2005) has therefore constantly entailed higher percentages of positive results for citizens from Latin America in comparison with immigrants from other origins. In 2000, 80% of applications by Argentines, 77% by Colombians and 76.6% of Ecuadorians were approved, while only 51% of those submitted by Moroccans, 53% by Algerians and 46.4% by Senegalese had a positive outcome.

Moreover, this was the beginning of an active recruitment period of foreign workers through bilateral agreements in which Colombia was the first signatory, followed by Ecuador (2001) and, fourth, by the Dominican Republic (2002). In the early days, though, there were also agreements with the countries of origin of some of the more numerous groups of foreigners in Spain, for example Morocco (2001) – being in fact the third signatory – and, later, Ukraine (2011), and others for border control reasons, like Mauritania (2007). The final result has been a certain incongruity between pan-Hispanic rhetoric and practice marked by pragmatism and compliance with EU interests. In fact, in terms of employment, only Chile and Peru – due to their respective bilateral contracts – are exempt from the clauses prioritising Spanish citizens when carrying out contracted work. However, clear positive discrimination does appear in the recruitment of students, thanks to travelling facilities offered to Latin American students – now a gold mine for Spanish universities – and official recognition of foreign higher education degrees.

There are initiatives making it easier to obtain Spanish nationality for descendants of Spanish emigrants, especially given the prominence of Latin America in the history of Spanish emigration. One example of this is the more recent Historical Memory Law (Law 52/2007, 27 December 2011 was the deadline for submission of applications), which benefited more than half a million Spanish people or their descendants who had lost their citizenship after having to go into exile between 1939 and 1955 because of the Civil War and the Franco regime (Izquierdo 2011). These naturalisations, however, have not automatically led to an increase in migratory flows. For citizens from countries like Cuba, Venezuela and Argentina, this represents a chance for future moves if required, but not necessarily with Spain as the destination.

Socio-demographic complementarities and extraordinary assimilation

The Hispano-American migratory boom in Spain is related to economic changes and demographic potential in the countries of origin, but also with improved levels of education (Prieto Rosas and López Gay 2015), particularly among women and, in general, their greater “agency”, which also contributes to female mobility. The increased demand for domestic workers in Spain is essentially the result of improved education among the country’s young generations – where the levels of higher education for women have surpassed those of men –, and the spread of dual-income households. These changes were not accompanied by policies reconciling family and working life (Domingo i Valls and Gill 2007). The demand for domestic and care workers, which is mainly covered by women, explains the peculiarity of immigration from Latin America in which women are more present than men and, moreover, have often been pioneers of migratory chains.

Besides the job market demand, there is also the marriage market, which is affected by a relative scarcity of women owing to a dramatic drop in Spain’s birth rate after the end of the 1970s and has led to a series of dwindling generations. And given the continuing age difference between men and women in favour of the former, this creates the effect of the shortage of women in the marriage market (Cabré 1994).

These features of the selection of migratory flows from Latin America have also given rise to an exceptional situation in terms of integration of these migrants into Spanish society compared to those of other origins. First of all, the preference expressed in opinion polls by the native population – always favouring Latin American immigrants over those from other origins – has shown a bias for including Latin Americans since, in terms of migration, they have been referred to as the “favourites” (Izquierdo et al. 2003). This might be summed up in a paradox-
ical absence of residential segregation – with better access to ownership (Módenas et al. 2013) or less discrimination in renting (Bosch et al. 2010) – and a high degree of segregation in employment associated with workers in domestic work (Sabater and Massey 2015). Similarly, Latin American participation in the job market is always higher, and unemployment levels for these workers are always lower than those of Africans (Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica 2007), both before and after the economic crisis (Ayasa-Lastra 2015). This situation is one of dependency on a feminised niche which has paid the price of over-qualification with an initial decline in social mobility – linked with irregular status in the first years after arrival (Parella 2015) – although with a relatively faster subsequent rise in legal and social status than that achieved by immigrants of other origins (Vidal-Coso and Vono de Vilhena 2015, Vidal-Coso et al. 2014).

Summary

The answer to the question guiding the research is complex. While it is true that immigrants arriving in Spain from Latin American countries show better integration indicators than those from Africa or Asia in terms of residential segregation and employment, it does not mean that they are unaffected by diminished social mobility and over-qualification in general: The 47.5% of Latin Americans employed in domestic work – according to the Census 2011 (INE) – had more than an elementary level of education and 11.8% had an even higher level, in contrast with natives (16.4% and 5.2% respectively) or Africans (24% and 7.2%), for example. What appears to be a mechanism for better integration could, in fact, reproduce inequality and aggravate exclusion. In sum, it is important to note the divergence between the pan-Hispanic rhetoric wielded by politicians and actual migration policy where, apart from differential access to nationality, personal situations and labour market characteristics are given higher priority than one’s origin. Nonetheless, the following points should be kept in mind:

• The social capital represented by knowledge of the language, together with the professed greater openness of the Spanish population towards Latin American immigrants are, in themselves, relative advantages independent of positive discrimination in the law.

• Despite the homogenising discourse of Hispanidad (“spanishness”), in practice, these migrants and their descendants are assimilated at different speeds and might even experience downward mobility depending on the ethnocultural label they are given in Spanish society, mainly as a result of race and class prejudices. This is what, in the United States, Portes and Zhou (1993) have called “segmented assimilation”.

• Through its colonial-style Hispanidad discourse, Spanish nationalism tends to lump together immigrants from Latin America in an ideal category of “Spanish”, which is both paternalistic and de-meaning.

• Finally, the arrival of the Latin American population and its rapid assimilation by comparison with other immigrant groups would entail frustration among and exclusion of immigrants from other countries. This applies especially to Moroccans who arrived earlier and who saw the glass ceiling of social mobility being significantly lowered when they were replaced in the niches they had occupied by workers from Latin America.

Footnotes

1 This contradiction has been summarised as the tension which gives rise in liberal states to a tendency of de-ethnicisation and another that is opposed to re-ethnicisation. See Joppke (2005).

2 Law of 15 July 1954, reforming the first title of the Civil Code, “On Spanish and Foreign Peoples”, justified in the Pre-amble: “Hence, once again, owing to the manifest predilection and goodwill with which, faithful to its past and hopeful of a lofty spiritual design Spain looks upon those countries for reasons that are well-known and superior to any kind of contingency, it deems itself inextricably united [...]”.

3 Besides immigrants from Latin America, citizens from the former colonies of Equatorial Guinea and the Philippines are included, as well as those from Andorra and, after the 1980s, descendants of the Sephardic population which was expelled from Spain in 1492.

4 The Spanish-born offspring of two foreign immigrants were granted Spanish nationality to prevent the child from being stateless, which also happened when the legislatures of neither of the parents’ countries conceded nationality to
the child, as was the case with such well-represented origins as Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia. The rule continued to be applied even after the laws regulating nationality were amended in these countries. See Álvarez Rodríguez (2006, 2014).

Some statements made to the press at the time are collected here, showing how the then State Secretary for Migration, Enrique Fernández Miranda, was concerned with giving priority to immigrants from Latin America, citing as his reasons shared language, history and religion, and how the Minister for Defence Federico Trillo, wanted to replace Muslim members of the Spanish armed forces with people from Latin American countries.

Delegación del Gobierno para la Extranjería y la Inmigración (Government Delegation on Aliens Affairs and Immigration), Process of Regularisation of Foreigners, from 21 March to 31 July 2000, Ministry of the Interior.

See, in this regard, the "Andrés Bello" Agreement in 13 Latin American countries.

Article 17.1 of the Civil Code establishes that sons and daughters of a Spanish father or mother are of Spanish origin so that, in the case of those born outside of Spain, the principle of *jus sanguinis* prevails. According to Article 22 of the Civil Code, descendants of Spaniards born outside of Spain with a father, mother, grandfather or grandmother who had originally been Spanish and had resided in Spain are eligible for Spanish citizenship. Law 36/2002 of 8 October, which amends the Civil Code with regard to citizenship, opened up new ways to recover citizenship or to pass it on to descendants.

In this domain, the coming together of Latin American women and Spanish men can be explained by an intricate set of complementarities in their shared expectations with regard to gender roles. See Domingo i Valls et al. (2014).

References


Introduction

With 500 years of cultural, linguistic and migratory interchange between Portugal and Brazil (with Brazil having been a Portuguese colony from 1500 until independence was declared in 1822), one might think that the integration of recently arrived Brazilian immigrants in Portugal's society would not be too strenuous; perhaps quite the opposite - simplified and effortless. Such a straightforward reading, however, is an over simplified one. Rarely is any coloniser/colonised relationship free from a complex historical past (Arenas 2005), and the Portugal/Brazil case is no different. In recent times, with the ever-growing distribution of knowledge, information and people in an ever-growing globalised world, Brazilian culture has particularly become quite familiar to the Portuguese, with an existing “attraction” towards Brazilian pop culture being very present in Portuguese society. Taking these points into consideration, the questions that loom are:

1) To what extent do perceptions held by Portuguese society towards Brazilians affect the integration of Brazilian immigrants in Portugal?

2) Is the “physical presence” of Brazilians in Portugal as welcome as Brazilian culture itself?

3) How is Brazilian immigrant integration eased?

This last question I will examine by observing the role of Brazilian immigrant associations when it comes to community integration and sense of belonging. With the aim of delving into these issues from a qualitative perspective, a “privileged” voice is given to representatives and intermediaries of Brazilian associations in Portugal. The findings are the result of interviews and informal conversations with 23 association leaders, members and volunteers, as well as information gathered through participant observation.

Patterns of Integration, Cultural Negotiations and the Roles of Brazilian Associations in Portugal (Late-1980s to the Present)

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This contribution sets out to:

- Discuss how socio-cultural differences and stereotypes tied to exoticism and sexuality have been constructed through time as a way of defining Brazilians in Portugal.

- Delineate how differences and stereotypes are propagated by mass media in Portugal and the consequences felt by Brazilians in Portugal.

- Examine how Brazilian associations have adopted “offensive” (improved integration measures and the attainment of equal citizenship rights) and “defensive” (actions relating to identity preservation and diffusion of culture) strategies as a way of combating integration difficulties.

Cultural differences and a (not so) warm welcome

The very idea of migrating from Brazil to Portugal and the preconceived romantic notions and images possessed by Brazilians before commencing their migration experience is often proven wrong once they have settled. From the ethnographic information gathered, the general sentiment expressed is that Brazilians come with a preconceived notion of Portuguese society being liberal and open, similar to the
way they perceive themselves. They see a country with a shared language, historical migration ties and common cultural roots, leading many to believe that integration will be eased. Instead, what they find is a nation and society many end up viewing as conservative. Once the differences are felt, culture shock often becomes a reality.

The most mentioned socio-cultural difference between Brazilians and the receiving society, according to the respondents, concerns the Portuguese being characterised as cold, unhappy, unreceptive, pessimistic and stand-offish, as opposed to Brazilians who are described as warm, friendly, happy and positive. Additional responses to what distinguishes Brazilians from the host society deal with personality traits such as experiences by the Portuguese society in the “warmth of the welcome” by Brazilians. The Portuguese are viewed as narrow-minded and judgemental, often willing to accept elements of Brazilian culture, but not too accepting of Brazilians.

The “exotic” or “tropical” side of Brazil, for example, has for centuries been present in Portugal (Machado 2007). Since colonising Brazil, the Portuguese have held a generalised, stereotypical image of that territory and its society, characterising it as sensual, tropical, liberal and extroverted. In the present day, the representations of Brazilians in Portugal, most frequently derived from images attached to Brazil – football, samba, soap operas, exotic women, etc., – are accentuated by the exoticism often attached to that imagery; an exoticism that many feel moulds the narrow-mindedness and stereotypical perceptions of the Portuguese towards Brazilians.

Job market niches on the part of Brazilians is particularly highlighted and considered to bring a double-edged form of acceptance. Brazilians have taken up positions in jobs that are highly visible, requiring contact with the general public. Many find themselves in service industries, namely restaurants, catering, retail sales, etc., while others are still employed in leisure-related sectors, such as the entertainment industry (e.g. dancers, musicians, etc.) or nightlife (clubs, bars, etc.), a sub-sector referred to as the “market of joy” (Machado 2003). As “sellers of an exotic culture”, Brazilians are thus seen as being in a privileged position, possessing the qualities that define “exotic Brazil” – as friendly, warm and sensual individuals who speak with an accent. This positive stereotyping puts Brazilians on the top of the list in the aforementioned labour sectors. However, the placing of Brazilians in these labour niches has also created resentment, with the tag of “invasion” often applied, something reiterated by one informant:

[…] [T]here is this view of Brazilians being everywhere now […] and it’s as if people feel threatened. The Portuguese have watched Brazilian soap operas on television their whole lives; they love our food, our music and so on. But there’s a love/hate relationship that people have towards us. People like our culture, but if you take that away, they don’t seem to like our presence very much (Representative of the association House of Brazil of Lisbon).

Before the steady stream of Brazilians immigrating to Portugal commenced in the late 80’s/early 90’s, Portugal was in fact supplied on a daily basis with images of Brazil via Brazilian soap operas (at one point, up to 11 could be viewed daily on Portuguese television), while radio stations dedicated large percentages of their programming time to Brazilian music (Machado 2003). The exposition of Brazilian cultural production has thus assisted in diffusing Brazilian symbolism, often associating it with exoticism, eroticism, tropicalism and joyfulness. The popularity of Brazilian popular culture demonstrates that a “Brazilian invasion” has, on the one hand, always been a welcomed one, but only from a safe, controllable distance. A physical invasion, on the other hand, sees “other sides of Brazil” – ones that may be accepted via mass media propagation (e.g. symbolism and imagery displayed via television or music), but not in the everyday life of Portuguese society.

» Propagating differences and stereotypes

From the interviews collected, it was expressed that the contributions of Portuguese media is most often to blame for perpetrating stereotypes in relation to Brazilian immigrants in Portugal. The accusations ranged from the way Portuguese media depicts Brazilians as bad neighbours (due to their constant partying and noisiness), as criminal offenders (e.g. often associated to the many that arrived in Portugal as undocumented immigrants, as well as Brazil’s reputation as a country where crime runs rampant) and the association of Brazilian women with prostitution. The prostitution issue, in fact, was given particular attention by my study’s participants and viewed as the issue that shines the most negative
light on their community. Although the incorporation of Brazilian women in the Portuguese labour market sees the majority working either in the commercial, domestic or hospitality sectors, there is a tendency to affiliate Brazilian women to the leisure and sex industry (Padilla 2007). Still, even beyond this, a study released in 2006 on how the Portuguese perceive different immigrant groups revealed that 70% of the Portuguese believed that Brazilian women contribute significantly to the growth of prostitution in Portugal (Lages 2007). The propagation of this stereotype is primarily owed to two over-arching reasons (Padilla 2005):

1) The construction and proliferation of “the cult of the body” in Brazil which, in turn, has created the myth of Brazilian female sensuality and created an image of Brazilian women as sexually liberated beings;

2) News stories on illegal Brazilian sex workers carrying out their trade in nightclubs throughout Portugal, as well as Brazilian prostitutes blamed for the destruction of families.

Concerning the first point, the Portuguese stereotypical association of Brazilian women being sensual and extroverted has been perpetuated since the 15th century; going as far back as the first images of native populations walking around naked. These images still remain, although, today, re-adjusted to fit new contexts – one that includes prostitution. Furthermore, as pointed out by such authors as Machado (1999) and Feldman-Bianco (2001), the image of Brazilian women as highly sexual and “easy” has been re-enforced and re-interpreted through Brazilian soap operas. Such imagery has led Portuguese society to view highly sexual, liberal behaviour as a common characteristic that serves to define Brazilian women. Thus, the transmission of such images and the reinforcement of such stereotypes among the Portuguese, and, above all, Portuguese men, leads many to believe and expect that these preconceived characteristics and behaviours will be reproduced by Brazilian women in the immigration setting as the following citation attests:

I have heard all kinds of stories: From Brazilian women who get into taxis and are asked by the drivers if they would prefer to pay with sex, to women who get sexually harassed by their bosses who think that this is normal behaviour in Brazil and, therefore, think they’re used to it. Because

Highlighted here is how preconceived labelling attached to Brazilian femininity is frequently associated to an ideology of exoticism and “easiness”. For the migrant women, just the fact that they are Brazilian automatically confers the affiliation.

This characterisation of Brazilian female prostitutes has also come to imply that they are in greater demand by those who frequent prostitutes. As a result, in the past, this has led to Brazilian women being blamed for the destruction of Portuguese families. The most notorious example is that of the case of Bragança, the northern Portuguese city where, in 2003, a group of Portuguese women organised a group calling themselves Mothers of Bragança (Mães de Bragança), claiming that Brazilian women were stealing their husbands and destroying their families. The case of the Mothers of Bragança gained international recognition when the European edition of Time magazine published an article about their cause. The internationalisation of the occurrence led to an increased focus on the Brazilian prostitution issue in the Portuguese media with emphasis being placed on the Brazilian prostitutes as family wreckers. The media treatment the Bragança situation received came to typify Brazilian women as the evil-doers, caracterising them as prostitutes and as opportunistic, “husband thieves”, creating a gender bias not experienced by women of other nationalities in Portugal.

**Associative strategies in time and space**

Taking the mentioned integration hardships into consideration, I now ask what sort of collective “plan of attack” is being considered by Brazilian associations when it comes to bettering integration.

Immigrant associations will promote the needs of their respective clientele, pursuing actions and objectives based on the perceived needs of their members at specific stages of the immigration process and in accordance with the interests and characteristics of the individuals they represent. According to Schrover and Vermeulen (2005), immigrant associations will often act within an offensive/defensive dichotomy. They will carry out “offensive” actions when improved integration measures and the at-
tainment of equal citizenship rights are on the line, working towards achieving rights to legalisation, labour, housing, education and health, among others. The “defensive” point-of-view is expressed through actions relating to identity preservation and diffusion of ethno-cultural interests, including the organisation of dance and/or music groups, organisation of festive and cultural events, religious celebrations and other events that promote the community.

In the case of Brazilians in Portugal, the importance given to the variables that frame the “offensive” side of the debate was in the late 90’s / early 2000’s. This was due to the fact that Brazilian immigration to Portugal – primarily characterised by the inflow of undocumented Brazilians – placed integration issues and citizenship rights at the forefront; a priority that meant ethno-cultural actions and/or identity-related issues often “took a backseat” (Sardinha 2009). Associations, therefore, worked as representatives of their members to obtain legal papers; on work-related issues such as the lack of labour contracts and combating labour market exploitation; as well as on rights to access social services, namely healthcare and housing.

Beyond these issues, a second set of insertion matters that has required attention is that of homesickness and loneliness, adaptation difficulties due to climate and geographical aspects, lack of acceptance on the part of Portuguese society, as well as discrimination, racism and stereotyping. Different from issues related to integration and rights, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that these problems are based on feelings of integration. Measuring “felt” integration, however, is a more complex process than measuring integration often influenced by State instruments and policies. It is here, in combating such “felt” integration difficulties, where the “defensive” side of Schrover and Vermeulen’s (2005) dichotomy comes into play.

The association representatives highlighted the carrying out of social and cultural events created with the intent of building networks of camaraderie and socialisation, conceived with the aim of helping break isolation and curb homesickness. However, they also made it clear that the majority of Brazilians do not seek out formal associations when it comes to creating personal networks with other Brazilians, nor are associations viewed by community members as pivotal structures when it comes to cultural maintenance and preservation:

You see large congregations of Brazilians intermingling and enjoying themselves in the esplanades, the beaches, at the bars where they often come together. Brazilians create their own groups of camaraderie with other Brazilians through work, through school, where they live and they don’t need a formal association to be Brazilian. Just their coming together guarantees bringing out Brazilian culture as well (Representative of the association Brazilian Association of Portugal).

That said, however, respondents equally pointed out that the work of associations often extends beyond the preservation of ethno-cultural identity on a one-on-one level, giving equal importance to the transmission of Brazilian culture with the intent of bringing awareness and trying to create greater openness within Portuguese society towards the Brazilian community. The importance of intertwining cultural elements and intercultural exchanges is seen as a key integration strategy – a way in which greater visibility can be given to Brazilian cultural components and identity elements, not as an independent variable, but as an intercultural instrument to be pooled alongside Portuguese cultural and identity references and exchanged. On this issue, it is key to remember that integration is a “two-way street” – so no matter how much immigrants may want to be accepted by the host society, if the host society creates obstacles, hindering any attempt at integration or even assimilation, the immigrants will not succeed. This may come in the form of discriminatory practices or through stereotyping, and as an example, I return to the stereotypical image of Brazilian women as prostitutes. Although highly referred to by the associations as a primary concern when it comes to the insertion of Brazilian women into Portuguese society, only a reduced number of the organisations pointed out having this issue as a key action front.

A general consensus is that mentalities can only be changed through campaigning, raising awareness and bringing greater visibility to the issues. However, it is also felt that campaigning and raising awareness is often difficult when mass media contributes to setting the stereotypes, as many feel has been the case.
Conclusion

Immigrant communities will adjust and operate in accordance with the situations established by the receiving society, and carry out their actions and coordinate their visibility tactics in accordance with the host societies’ openness. Consequently, the degree of differentiation, stereotypical perceptions, as well as lack of equal rights to citizenship plays a primary role in defining collective actions. The degree of integration of Brazilians in Portugal is thus determined by the ethno-cultural contrasts, and the acceptance and recognition of those contrasts by the host society, free of discrimination and stereotypes.

References


German Expellees in Post-War West Germany and Canada

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Introduction

In the aftermath of World War II, more than 12 million Germans lost their homes in Central and Eastern Europe. The overwhelming majority resettled in Germany where they have since played a very prominent role, notably through powerful lobby associations which called for a return to the homeland well into the 1980s (Beer 2011; Connor 2007; Ahonen 2004). However, expellees – known in Germany as Heimatvertriebene or, simply, Flüchtlinge (refugees) – also found themselves stranded in Western Europe, Africa and the Americas. In fact, over 800,000 expellees came to live abroad², notably in Canada where over 80,000 expellees settled (Maeder 2011).

How did these expellees fare compared to their counterparts on the old continent? One could expect considerably different outcomes in terms of social and cultural integration, especially when comparing West Germany and Canada. After all, in the immediate post-war years, the contrast between the two countries could not have been more different. On the one hand, Germany, or what was left of Germany, was an occupied country – politically, economically and morally bankrupt. The integration of nearly eight million expellees in the Western occupation zones seemed nearly impossible then (as it did for the 4 million in the eastern zone or what became the German Democratic Republic). In 1950, one in six residents in West Germany had an expellee background (Reichling 1989). In marked contrast, Canada, as a member of the Allied Alliance, was prosperous and prided itself as a land of democracy, opportunity and success. Certainly, expellees in Canada were comparatively few, but they were part of a long history of mass immigration. During the late 19th and early 20th century, in the post-World War II years, Canada admitted large numbers of immigrants: In the 15 years after World War II, there were over 1.5 million immigrants, who represented 10% of Canada’s population in 1945. Germans figured prominently in what in Canada became known as the “post-war German immigration boom” (Knowles 2016; Schmalz 2000).

This contribution is based on recorded oral histories and (un)published autobiographies collected for a dissertation project (Maeder 2011), and highlights similarities between the life stories of expellees in West Germany and Canada. Despite the disparate conditions at the outset, in both countries expellees were exposed to prejudice and xenophobia, starting out as an “underclass”, confined often to lower-skilled jobs, and noted and scorned for their phys-

• As shown with the example of German expellees¹ in post-war West Germany and post-war German expellees living in Canada, xenophobia does not exempt migrants who share the same ethnic or racial background as the host society.

• To give meaning to successful social and economic integration processes and gain public acceptance, German expellees turned to local homeland traditions, like joining the general discourse of the Heimat in West Germany or, as in Canada, celebrating cultural diversity.

• In doing so, German expellees generated new identities of belonging and thereby reconfigured the confines of in- and exclusion, also based on personal experience. Hence in Canada, expellees saw themselves as equals to other Eastern European immigrants, which is in strong contrast to West Germany where returned expellees generally looked down on their former Eastern European neighbours.
ical appearance, language and culture. And yet, as shown here in the second part of this paper, these personal accounts taken in late 1970s and 1980 also document how, in the end, they became part of their new homeland. In these accounts they highlight the opportunities they were given in capitalist societies bent on economic growth and prosperity; and the hard work and industry they showed to “make their way up”, all of which they attributed to ethno-cultural traits they had brought along to the new country. In so doing, and drawing on scholarship on nationalism and social integration (Giddens 1984), this paper shows how expellees in both countries eventually adopted identities as Germans or Canadians which reflected their experience of extreme nationalism, war and expulsion, as well as the initially difficult settlement into a new political, social and cultural environment.

### Prejudice and xenophobia

In the years immediately after 1945, newcomers in what was left of Germany and Canada faced strong resentments. In Germany, as widely documented by other research, locals blamed expellees for the radically deteriorating living conditions, the soaring incidence of crime, the spread of contagious diseases, hunger, the ubiquitous destitution or, even, for the outbreak and loss of the war. Expellees in Germany faced rampant xenophobia, setting them apart from locals and making them the object of ridicule and hatred. Mainly in the countryside and in small towns that had been less affected by the Allied bombing and the war, locals easily recognised the distinct dialects of expelled Germans from Central and Eastern Europe and collectively branded them as “riff-raff”. Wearing frayed clothing or pulling a handcart packed with all their belongings in search of shelter, they were pigeonholed as Rucksackdeutsche (“Backpack Germans”) or “gypsies”. Expellees looked different, ate different food, possessed nothing and, above all, were seen as using resources that locals deemed they did not deserve. Even once the economic situation in West Germany improved, expellees continued to be singled out as undeserving people who unduly benefit from assistance from the state. For instance, when the West German government passed the Equalization of the Burden Act in 1952, providing expellees with some compensation for lost properties in Central and Eastern Europe, people recalled in their personal accounts how they were accused of inflating claims and profiteering from the government.

Decidedly, albeit of German background, expellees were “strangers in their own land”.

Meanwhile, in Canada, the Nazi German stigma was pervasive. During and after the war, German immigrants changed their names (Hans became John; Heinrich turned into Henry, etc.) and German was not spoken in public often. As for expellees, Canadians frequently made no distinction: After all, in their eyes, they were Germans, too. Consequently, aid for the numerous needy expellees in occupied Germany came essentially from Canadians with an ethnic German background, whereas Canadians, in general, accused Germans of war crimes and genocide, and stereotyped them as obedient and war-mongering. After 1945, German nationals continued to be banned from immigration, though this started to change even before the Cold War turned hot.

A German-Canadian lobby (Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees, CCCRR) managed to open immigration to ethnic Germans, though not to German nationals, but to Czechs, Poles, Russians and stateless people or, in short, the so-called Volksdeutsche and/or “displaced persons”. Drawing directly from nationalist pan-German and Nazi rhetoric, German-Canadian lobby groups managed to convince Canadian authorities that the so-called Volksdeutsche were presumably less guilty than “real” Germans from the pre-1938 Reich. In so doing, these lobby groups drew on long-standing traditions in Canadian immigration policy, which since the late 19th century had favoured white immigrants from Britain and, second to them, immigrants from Germany, Eastern Europe and Scandinavia.

By 1950, Canadian authorities dropped the immigration ban on German nationals and reinstated their old favoured status. In the subsequent ten years, over 200,000 German immigrants arrived in Canada, representing nearly one in six immigrants in Canada in the 1950s (Maeder 2011). Two-fifths of the German immigrants had an expellee background, suggesting that expellees were 2.5 times as likely to immigrate to Canada than German immigrants born in West Germany. However, one should note that this over-representation was mainly due to German immigrants from Russia, the Baltics and Southeastern Europe. Though only small minorities among the overall expellee population, a very high proportion of them left war-torn Germany. By comparison, only 5% of the German immigrants arriving in the late 1940s and 1950s to Canada were Ger-
manns from former Czechoslovakia or the so-called Sudetenland. This is comparatively few given that they made up nearly a third of West Germany’s expellee population. Similarly, German nationals who were born in what became Polish territories in 1945 were just as likely to migrate to Canada as Germans born in the western parts of the country. This suggests a complex web of interrelated factors that led to the disproportionate settlement of expellees who originated from ethnic German communities in Russia, the Baltics, Ukraine, Romania or Hungary – all of whom were groups which German authorities viewed as backward peasants and thought of as difficult to integrate. Yet, for Canadian officials, these were precisely the type of immigrants they held in esteem.

Expellees as fellow citizens

Life histories as told by expellees typically narrate at length the years of the war and its aftermath. Stories include the horror of the war, flight, evictions and the loss of the Heimat (which women experienced quite differently than men who often lived through the early post-war years in prisoner-of-war camps). The subsequent years of settlement and integration are not given as much time and attention in their accounts even though they generally cover two decades or more of their life. In the accounts of expellees in West Germany and Canada, these were years marked by work and the unprecedented economic boom of the post-war years. Besides family events, their accounts testify to increased prosperity and affluence. That said, purchases of the first fridge, television or even car are well remembered.

The same holds true for their cultural integration. While they extensively document the kind of xenophobia they encountered in the early post-war years in both West Germany and Canada, they say considerably less about the way they perceive themselves in their new society. Most scholars have thus far argued that expellees assimilated to West German and Canadian society, adopting an identity centred on economic success and the “golden years” of the post-war years (Lehmann 1991; Bassler 1991). However, this is only one side of the coin. Prosperity and economic success certainly played an important role to construct new identities of belonging, yet expellees in both West Germany and Canada also thought of themselves as having contributed to this economic boom through their labour and mobility. In so doing, they used cultural traits to explain the outcome, i.e.

This process of identity formation was fuelled by expellee organisations which celebrated the Heimat to lay claim to the lost territories. Yet, while for expellee organisations the loss of the homeland remained unacceptable until the 1970s and beyond, for most ordinary expellees in both Canada and West Germany, the use of the Heimat was a way to reconcile the past with the present. To expellees on both sides of the Atlantic, it made sense to celebrate regional traditions and cultures. After all, in their daily lives, they encountered them every day. In West Germany, they heard dialects from Westphalia or Bavaria as much as dialects from former East Prussia, Silesia or from the former German settlements in Hungary and Romania. In Canada, this was the same with the added and significant difference that they heard even more different accents and languages with immigrants flocking into the country from elsewhere in Europe. So, in short, while immigrants from the Ukraine or Italy celebrated their cultural origins, German immigrants in Canada, including expellees, observed traditions from the home region on the “old continent” so as to avoid the Nazi stigma and join Canada’s emerging new national identity centred on cultural diversity and the so-called “Canadian mosaic” (Jacovetta et al. 1998).

“German provincials” and “Euro-Canadians”

Two examples illustrate this process of identity formation. In his autobiography, Horst, one of the interviewees, told the story of his release from a prisoner-of-war camp, finding himself stranded in Schleswig-Holstein, Northern Germany. With the help of the Red Cross, he found his wife shortly thereafter in a camp also located in Northern Germany. Like
most other expellees, he encountered strong resentment. After 1948, he moved to the Frankfurt region, taking a job with an electricity company. In marked contrast to his time in Schleswig-Holstein, he found that in the Frankfurt region, his German dialect from Gdansk (Danzig) was very much appreciated, especially by middle-class customers who could understand his clearly enunciated German better. He could live again as a Danziger in his new environment. Not surprisingly, he also associated the industriousness of the Danzig people with the German “economic miracle”. To him, Danzigers, East Prussians or Silesians had been instrumental for West Germany’s rapid economic recovery. Moreover, like many other expellees, Horst also had a negative view of his former home region, which he saw lost to communism and the Polish people.

Elisabeth, another interviewee, had come to Canada after World War II. She had left her home region in Southern Hungary (Banat) with the retreating German armies and in May 1945, found herself stranded in Austria. She quickly moved to Munich, Bavaria, where she later located a family member. Three years later she moved to Canada as a displaced Volksdeutsche. In her oral history, taken in the late 1970s, she romanticised her home region, which in her mind had always been a peaceful and prosperous farming region. The war years and the immediate post-war period had been terrible, filled with hunger and resentment from the local people. Yet, her memories of the first years in Canada were equally filled with obstacles and offences. As she explained to the interviewer, she did not see herself as a “real” German, but rather a Volksdeutsche who, she presumed, had nothing to do with Nazi war crimes. Thus, while distancing herself from the presumably more guilty Germans from Germany, she associated herself with an ethnic German identity. As she put it, she was a proud Canadian of Danube-Swabian origin. In Canada she felt at home and accepted, and as part of “the United Nations at work”. In her personal account, she saw herself as one of the many keen immigrants from war-torn Europe who had left the old continent and helped build a prosperous country in Canada.

### Conclusion

Comparing Horst and Elisabeth’s accounts of their lives in West Germany and Canada, an image of the original Heimat as a source of strength and industry emerges which they mould into their new sense of belonging. This clearly shows some of the patterns of exclusion and inclusion. At first unwanted and not welcome, expellees in both West Germany and Canada even found their way into national representations, by celebrating homeland traditions alongside the economic prosperity they had contributed to. In order to give meaning to successful social and economic integration processes, migrants such as German expellees turned to local homeland traditions to gain public acceptance and feel integrated. However, the representations they foster are themselves the source of new exclusions. This is particularly obvious when comparing the views of non-German ethnic groups, which Horst and Elisabeth did in their accounts of the post-war years. These may be generalised, clearly indicating that the interplay of contexts and experience shape people’s cultural adaptation quite differently. Thus, while in West Germany, expellees such as Horst had nothing good to say about Poles, Russians and Czechs; in Canada, these ethnic groups were fully part of the nation they celebrated and belonged to. In marked contrast to their West German counterparts, expellees in Canada like Elisabeth had learned to be tolerant and be part of a white, multi-ethnic state. Migration systems going back to the late 19th century had clearly favoured their admission to Canada, perceived as white settlers, industrious and hard working. Needless to say, with the onset of new forms of inclusion in the 1970s and 1980s, stressing racial discrimination and diversity, expellees like many other immigrants and white Canadians struggled to come to terms with change.

### Footnotes

1. From a migration point of view, there are many ways expellees came to be in West Germany. Most fled to the Western parts of the crumbling Third Reich and were stranded in what became West Germany. Many (i.e. four million) were shipped/transported from Eastern Europe to the West. And then there are the many German men who were released from prisoner-of-war camps who found that they could not go back to their home in Eastern Europe, so they went to occupied Germany instead. And then there are also German people in exile, including in Canada, who found themselves unable to return and therefore stayed. All these are expellees – including those who then immigrated to Canada after 1950.

2. Whilst in exile (coming originally from the Sudetenland...
or Poland), Germans found themselves stranded in Canada and elsewhere. Sweden notably had a large German exile community; most stayed after the war, some "returned" like Willy Brandt. The bulk of expellees referred to here are immigrants from West Germany, but there are also substantial numbers coming from Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Mexico where it was "easier" to go after the war. Many among them were Mennonites.

References


German Expellees in West Germany After 1945 and Their Integration into Church Communities

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- German expellees had to face various forms of discrimination by the local population, especially in the first several years after their arrival to Germany.

- Adherence to the religion of the same denomination as the receiving community did not automatically lead to a smooth integration of the expellees into a local church community.

- Although some segments of the local population refused or were hesitant to make any concessions to the expellees within their process of integration, the receiving society as a whole went through large and long-lasting structural changes.

- The impact of the integration of expellee members on the development of church communities of both denominations was predominately positive.

Introduction

Between 1944 and 1950, postwar Germany experienced one of the biggest and most significant waves of immigration in its history, which consisted of German Reich citizens or ethnic Germans who had been living in East, Central and Southeast Europe up until then. Already in the last months of the war, hundreds of thousands of East Prussian Germans and members of German minorities in Eastern Europe became refugees while fleeing from the advancing Soviet army. Once the war was over, many other Germans were forced to leave their homes due to the newly established German-Polish borders. At the same time, most German minorities were expelled to Germany or other neighbouring countries by governments of liberated states in East, Central and Southeast Europe as revenge for occupation by German Nazis and war atrocities (Beer 2011).

As a consequence, around 12 million German war refugees and post-war expellees arrived in the war-destroyed land, under the control of Allied powers, 8 million of which landed in West German zones (Connor 2007). As ethnic Germans or citizens of the former German Reich (Volksdeutsche), they obtained the same legal status as the local German population almost immediately. Their economic integration was mainly completed within the following decade and it was then considered one of the first big political achievements of the young West German Republic. The economic indicators highlight, however, only a part of the complex and dynamic process of the integration. Although the individual trajectories of every single newcomer differed from each other, an overwhelming majority of witnesses remembered the process of integration from being far from smooth (Kossert 2008).

The term expellees, which from here on refers to the whole group of above-mentioned immigrants, should not hide the fact that this group was very heterogeneous. They came from various socio-economic milieus in both rural and urban areas, which differed from country of origin. Nevertheless, these and many other differences were overshadowed by several commonalities as soon as they crossed the German border: As members of German minorities,
they all had experienced some kinds of disadvantage and even violence in their lands of origin after the end of the war and during their expulsion; they arrived in Germany with no or very little property; they suffered from loss of their homeland and relatives. As a consequence, they had to cope with their new identity as immigrants and face prejudices connected to it.

From the perspective of the local population, the expellees seemed to be first and foremost a homogeneous mass of strangers, despite the fact that the new citizens had similar cultural backgrounds and spoke German as their mother tongue. The potential danger of the “intruders” was mainly caused by the fear that they would make the life of the impoverished receiving society even harder (Erker 1988: 384). However, it would be a mistake to also consider the receiving society as a homogeneous group of people who all believed the same negative stereotypes and prejudices. Numerous testimonies tell stories about receiving warm welcomes, living peacefully together, selfless help and both open and hidden support from individuals, as well as organisations or community representatives all over the country. In the first several years, however, the negative approach of the locals towards expellees was more common (Lehmann 1991, Wagnerová 1990).

The following text will shed some light on the most important areas of everyday interaction between the expellees and the West German receiving society in the first post-war decade. It will focus on the emotional dimension of friction and conflict between expellees and the local community, and its consequences. Subsequently, it will take a closer look at church communities and their double role as areas and actors in the integration of expellees.

German expellees in West Germany: Challenges of integration

The most urgent goals of the Allied powers and German local authorities regarding the expellees were to provide them with housing and employment in order to arrange for their self-sufficiency as soon as possible. Poor food supplies and the lack of housing in Germany reached alarming dimensions even before millions of expellees joined hundreds of thousands of Holocaust survivors, released forced labourers and other displaced persons who stayed all over Germany for several months or years after the war ended. Numerous inhabitants of German cities evacuated to the countryside after heavy air raids, which created enormous burdens on the rural areas where transports of expellees were heading. The capacity of relatives, support volunteers and charitable organisations to host the influx of individuals and entire families ran out fast. Improvised shelters and so-called refugee camps were organised in public spaces, such as taverns and gyms, in former labour barracks or military facilities.

How long people spent in refugee camps differed from place to place. The move into the first room or flat in private houses was usually only the first of many stops before they finally settled down, given the temporary character of living in involuntarily shared flats and houses with the landlord or another expellee family. In many cases, living together peacefully only lasted several months because as it became clearer that the expellees would not be able to return to their homelands, they were not seen as guests, but more as insufferable or openly hated cohabitators (Dettmer 1983: 312-313). Many other witnesses reported constant bullying on the part of the locals from the very start, such as removing all of the furniture or refusing to provide wood for heating in the winter (Wagnerová 1990: 388).

Unquestionably, homes were areas of frequent conflicts between the expellees and the locals on an everyday level. This could have lasted for several months or years because the definitive solution was finding privacy in one’s own house or flat, which was not possible without a job and money. It was easier for qualified workers to find an appropriate job in and around urban and industrialised areas, yet expellees were not allowed to change their assigned domicile without permission until 1949. That is why many expellees might have felt trapped; especially older people and single mothers with children living and working on a farm, who were often paid in kind (Dettmer 1983: 313). Besides that, hard work in the fields, unfamiliar for those who came from urban and industrialised environments, led to other conflicts between expellees and the owners of the farm accompanied by feelings of annoyance, defiance, anger and contemptuousness (Erker 1988: 389). But not all expellees considered their living conditions desperate. Farmers who saved their farm animals had a big advantage in obtaining well-paid jobs. Specific craftsmen or teachers were also more successful in finding jobs than other expellees because their skills and knowledge were needed (Lehmann 1991: 25).
Generally, being employed and engaged in social and cultural associations positively influenced the acceptance of expellees by the receiving society. It was usually easier in cities and agglomerations, which provided anonymity to expellees and more possibilities to interact with their cohabitants than small towns and villages did (Parisius 2011). The stronger and tighter the bonds within a community, the more persistent the fears and prejudices against unknown and allegedly dangerous newcomers might have been, regardless of their individual histories and future ambitions. An expellee was commonly labelled as someone who belongs to a subordinate social category, further specified by other stereotypes. “Refugees” as a swear word implied the presumed foreignness and volatile nature of migrants. Other offensive words regarding the lack of assets (Habenichts) were usually accompanied with incredulosity or contempt of the natives for expellees’ depiction of their former living standards and lost property (Dettmer 1983: 384). Mixed couples of locals and expellees who wanted to marry had to count on serious conflicts within families, especially if one member of the pair was of different faith.

The fact that expellees were ethnic Germans did not protect them from being treated as others by the receiving society because on the local level, differences usually played a bigger role than commonalities. The use of various regional dialects by expellees was not only a typical object of ridicule, but it indeed created some problems in understanding between natives and newcomers at the beginning. While children easily learned the standard German or the local dialect, older expellees continued to speak the way they did in their homelands, not least because of nostalgia they felt. That is why many of them also preserved their regional traditions and manners although this might have caused displeasure and misunderstanding by the natives (Kossert 2008: 126–127).

During the 1950s, most expellees succeeded in gaining jobs and respected socio-economic status, which weakened the impact of the mentioned labels. However, the stigma of being a “refugee” still created long-lasting visible hierarchies and borders between “us” and “them”. For example, separate housing settlements for expellees, seating arrangements in the local church, or divided groups of locals and expellees in the local pub, at village feasts or at weddings of mixed couples (Dettmer 1983: 315). Nevertheless, these differences did not usually lead to open hostility and conflicts any more.

### Integration of Catholic expellees into church communities

Both Catholic and Protestant Churches, together with affiliated charitable organisations, participated in providing first aid for expellees, which involved supplying and delivering food, clothes and other necessities directly after their arrival. Later, they organised donation campaigns among local populations and a service to try to find missing relatives for expellees. They also provided legal assistance and help finding jobs and houses, especially for expellees living in refugee camps (Bendel 2009a: 817-818). Therefore, they significantly helped to improve the material situation of many expellees, regardless of their denomination.

At the same time, both Churches made a great effort to take care of the mental and spiritual state of expellees through realising their primary aim of serving God. It meant that they had to both integrate their new expellee members into their old structures and deal with the presence of expellees of different faith. Since most expellees were not permitted to decide themselves about their residence, many Protestants landed in predominantly Catholic regions and vice versa. Districts which remained homogeneous regarding the religion of its inhabitants almost ceased to exist (Erker 1988: 382-383). Such development was perceived by some representatives of both Churches as a threat to the solidity of faith of their members.

From the perspective of expellees, the changes in practising their religion were not less dramatic. Being scattered all over Germany, they lost their close connection to the well-known and trusted home priests and other members of their church communities. The biggest challenge for both Catholic and Protestant expellees was to practice their religion in the region with another dominant denomination (Bendel 2009b: 61-85). This meant joining an existing diaspora church community or creating a new one. The latter was especially difficult because of missing clergy personnel and poor material logistics. The first solutions regarding the lack of a house of worship differed from place to place. In some locations, clergymen of both Churches agreed on the use of the same building for a certain period while in other places, local church authorities were against such practice. Some expellee priests preferred conducting service in a tavern, gym or on a hayfield than in a house of different denomination in order to save
their community members from temptation by the different faith.

Since the diasporic priests were responsible for a high number of little communities scattered throughout a vast area, services in some villages did not take place frequently. Some religiously affiliated expellees were willing to walk several kilometers to another church of the same denomination in the neighbourhood. Other expellees did not mind attending religious service at the local church, even if it was of different denomination (Bendel 2009a: 236). Testimonies spoke of expellees working on farms who were forced to go to church of different denomination together with the farmer’s family. Yet, forced conversion could have had a more attractive side: Talented, but poor expellees were offered a scholarship under the condition they would convert (Kossert 2008: 226).

Challenges for Catholic or Protestant expellees came, however, not only from the outside. Diaspora church communities consisted of Christians from different regions and countries, who were singing different songs and practising more or less different religious rituals and traditions. It took time to get to know each other, to negotiate and to agree on practices to be shared, especially if the members of the church community changed often due to the high fluctuation of expellees in the first several years. In many cases, however, expellees in diaspora church communities were more successful in preserving their idiosyncratic religious traditions, liturgy elements and songs than expellees who had integrated into an already existing church structure whose denomination was predominant in the region. This was, for example, the case of many Sudeten Germans who predominantly belonged to the Catholic Church and settled in Southern Bavaria, West Hesse and other Catholic regions. While insisting on their own religious practices and traditions, they received the label “Bohemian Catholics”, which stood for a lack of piety and general religious demeanour of the accepted Bavarian Catholicism (Erker 1988: 398). Some local priests were even afraid of “religious bolshevism” brought by liberal Sudeten German Catholics who would ruin the “good customs” of locals. Sudeten German Catholics, on the other hand, refused to assimilate because they considered Bavarian priests to be too strict and orthodox (Erker 1988: 397).

Thus, integration of expellees into church communities was not automatically easier if most of the expellees were of the same denomination as the majority of the local population. Following up with the example of Sudeten Germans in Bavaria, it was not a lack of sacred buildings or lack of staff that local church communities struggled with most. On the contrary, the arrival of expellee priests created a surplus of clergymen. Some expellee priests had to wait for an appointment for several years until missing priests from local parishes were declared dead. Existing rivalry and disagreement between local and expellee priests were especially evident regarding the question of Pastoral care for expellees. Even if the needs of expellees for solace and consolation of their specific traumas and suffering were recognised and taken into consideration, the Church authorities generally disapproved of adopting foreign traditions in order to avoid the creation of distinctive expellee church communities. Therefore, Catholic expellees were supposed to give up their specific religious practices and assimilate themselves to established church communities as soon as possible (Kossert 2008: 232). The majority of expellee priests, however, tended to make more concessions to the expellee members. Some leading expellee priests like Catholic Pater Paulus Sladek tried to create the spiritual homeland of expellees in a new community joining expellees and locals on the ground of commonly shared values and with respect to their mutual idiosyncracy (Sladek 1948/1949: 348-349). Yet, his endeavour was only partially put into practice depending on specific communities.

Conclusion

With the mass arrival of expellees, the majority of the local population viewed them as strange, poor or a danger to the stability and security of the local society. Most of these fears did not prove to be true or the stereotypes became less believable over the course of 1950s. Concurrently, the frequency of everyday conflicts on the ground of negative stereotypes and the open hostility between the receiving society and the expellees declined and the mutual trust, acceptance and respect rose. The process of integration, however, took place at different speeds and intensity in various private and public areas of life depending on the gender, the age, professional skills, aims and ambitions of the expellees, as well as based on coincidences which determined geographical localities as their starting positions.

The last aspect played an important role regarding
the integration process in church communities. Almost everywhere, the presence of expellees of different faiths strengthened the sense of alienation of locals towards expellees. Surprisingly, expellees of the same denomination also felt like strangers in the new church communities because of their different religious traditions. Since religious practices of the local and expellee members of the community were themselves objects of negotiation, they could not have served immediately as integration vehicles. The same faith of the expellees was thus not a guarantee for their easier integration, even if many clergymen, especially expellees themselves, made a great effort to reach it.

Most problems and conflicts between new and old members of church communities of both denominations faded out over several years. From a long-standing perspective, there is no doubt, that the arrival of expellees accelerated the dissolution of the religious homogeneity all over Germany, yet revitalised the community life in rural districts and led to the individualisation of religious practices. The arrival of expellees also enriched religious traditions of the locals – new forms of piety, which went hand-in-hand with the revitalisation of community life (Kosser 2008: 230).

Footnotes

1 The most common name for the German immigrants at the time of their arrival was "refugees", opposed by many expellees themselves who intended to stress the involuntary nature of their migration. Unlike German law, which differs between several terms such as Heimatvertriebenen, Vertriebene or politische Flüchtlinge, current scholars tend to use the term expellee as an umbrella name for Germans who were evacuated or fled from war, as well as for Germans from Eastern Europe who went through Soviet prisons of war or escaped illegally from from the Soviet Zone / GDR and arrived later in West Germany.

2 The earliest and largest collection of documentation and eyewitness reports was created by a commission of the Federal Ministry for Displaced Persons, Refugees and War Victims. See Schieder, T. et al. (1992).

References


Parisius, B. (2011): “Dass man natürlich in der Stadt mehr Möglichkeiten hat, das zu verwirklichen, was man will, ist klar.” Integrationen in Niedersachsen und Hamburg. “[It’s Obvious That One Had More Possibilities in the Town to Real-


The Alchemy of Integration

Russians in Bulgaria

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- Bulgarians and Russians share an Orthodox religion, Slavic languages, the Cyrillic alphabet and key historic periods, yet policies of integration have fluctuated from the humanitarian treatment of Russian refugees after the First World War to hostile discourse in the current post-communist period.

- The methodological framework of the study is defined as the triangle of the “alchemy of integration” with its three apexes of culture, politics and policy, and migrant agency at the analytical centre.

- The Russians in Bulgaria are analysed in three perspectives: The socio-economic profile, the waves of Russian immigration and the respective policies of integration of the Bulgarian State, and the strategies of integration of the Russian community.

- In the interactions between politics and culture, politics always wins in the conception and implementation of integration policies. The cultural similarities have not softened or dampened the abrupt political transitions.

- Culture prevails in the micro-strategies of migrant agency. They occupy a broad spectrum, from voluntary assimilation to hybrid Russo-Bulgarian identities.

- The alchemy of integration is expressed in the paradox that despite the political discourses fluctuating from admiration to accusation, the micro-strategies of integration of most Russians in Bulgaria are successful in building intercultural bridges.

One morning, Bulgaria made the global news: The Soviet Army Monument in Sofia had been painted in vibrant colours. Both the Bulgarian and the international public were impressed by the similarities between the heroes from the two symbolic universes – the Soviet one and the Hollywood one. I chose to start with this example because the Soviet Army Monument in the centre of Sofia is a polarised “lieu de mémoire” (site of memory), the subject of symbolic battles and interpretations, which also characterises the public discourses about the Russian community in Bulgaria.

This contribution examines whether cultural resemblances, such as a shared cultural heritage, language or religion, may systematically lead to better integration. The case of the Russian community in Bulgaria will show that politics plays first violin and culture comes second. Bulgarians and Russians share an Orthodox religion, Slavic languages, the Cyrillic alphabet and key historic periods, yet policies of integration...
have fluctuated from the humanitarian treatment of Russian refugees after the First World War to hostile discourse in the current post-communist period.

The following analysis is divided into four parts. The first part outlines the methodological framework of the study as the triangle of the “alchemy of integration” with its three apexes of culture, politics and policy, and migrant agency at the analytical centre. The second section presents the socio-economic profile of the Russian community in Bulgaria. In the third part, the periods of waves of Russian migration and the respective policies of integration are defined. The fourth part introduces three portraits and three strategies of integration. The concluding remarks “measure” the analytical weight of politics and policies, from one side, and culture, from another side, in the integration of Russians in Bulgaria.

Migrant agency, or the alchemy of integration

I have structured the triangle of the alchemy of integration around the three apexes of culture, politics and policies. Its analytical centre is occupied by migrant agency, which defines and unfolds its integration strategies in the dynamic political environment.

![Figure 1: Triangle of the alchemy of integration.](image)

The culture in the analysed case of the Russian community in Bulgaria consists of three major “substances” shared by both communities – Slavic languages, Orthodox religion and the Cyrillic alphabet. The alchemical message the scheme conveys is that politics and migrant agency shape the culture and its shared “substances” in different, various and, sometimes, opposite ways.

Politics is intimately interwoven with sites of memory, identities and integration alike. The narratives – political, public or academic – about the Russian community are perhaps the most politicised. Politics – pre-communist, communist and post-communist – form the intersection between the integration policies of the Bulgarian state and the integration strategies of the Russian community. The present contribution focuses on the complex and dynamic interactions between politics, integration and migrant agency. It examines the ways in which different political regimes impose different interpretations and uses on a single cultural identity.

Being Russian in Bulgaria: A demographic and socio-economic profile

The Russian community (9,978 members as of 2011, or 0.1% of the population of Bulgaria) is the largest migrant group in Bulgaria. Russians – like most migrants – are predominantly part of the urban population, concentrated in the capital and the major cities: Sofia (3,127), Varna (1,358) and Burgas (1,107) (Bulgarian National Statistical Institute).

Their professional portrait looks considerably different from other groups of foreigners. Its most specific trait is diversification. While members of certain migrant groups work only in particular ethnic niches – ethnic restaurants and shops – Russians work everywhere: In businesses, the service sector, education, science and culture. They also work in the national or local public administration – an occupation that is untypical for any other migrant community (Krasteva 2008).

Each wave of Russian migration has shown a specific gender (dis)balance. The first waves – of the few veterans from the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War and the many individuals from the White movement in 1917-23 – were almost exclusively male, whereas Soviet migration was almost exclusively female. Most Russians in Bulgaria are in mixed marriages. The vast majority of Russian women arrived with their Bulgarian husband. No other community demonstrates such high levels of intermarriage – a crucial indicator for integration.
Table 1: Number of Russians in Bulgaria. Notes: *Total number of Slavs. Source: Census data from the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute.

I divide the history of Russian migration to Bulgaria into four periods corresponding to waves, each characterised by its specific profile and integration strategy.

The first wave (beginning of the 19th century): The “Old Believers” – well negotiated elasticity of identity

The Cossack Old Believers came to Bulgaria in the early 19th century. Their migration was religious in nature: They left Russia after a reform of the Orthodox Church that they refused to accept, remaining true to the old rites. Nowadays, their descendants live in two villages near Varna and Silistra (Atanasova 1998; 2005). This small colourful community is interesting for three reasons. The first reason is because of the parallel worlds of the community and macro-society: The religious ethos of the group is extremely rigorous; there is no talk of divorce and adultery, men have long beards, etc. In order to reconcile modern life with the strict religious norms, Old Believers have adopted a parallel existence in their social spaces and their life cycles. The fact that an official in the local municipality is divorced does not impact social communication, but severely limits it during community celebrations, religious holidays, rituals, etc. Explicit signs of identity, such as long beards, are a privilege of the elderly when they are at that stage of their lives when they can develop all aspects of their faith (Atanasova 1998; 2005). Old Believers perfectly illustrate the heuristic notion of elasticity of identity while “negotiating” the relations between their community and various political regimes: During communism, they emphasised their Russian ethnicity and language, whereas in post-secular, post-communist countries, they openly demonstrate the true core of their group identity: Old Belief Orthodoxy.

The second wave (after the October Revolution): The Whites – a subject of humanitarian and integration policies

The October Revolution, like all revolutions, generated an enormous wave of refugees, fleeing from the Bolshevik regime and from famine: Supporters of the White movement, aristocrats, bourgeois, Mensheviks (Krasteva 2006). Between 1919 and 1923, 35,000 disarmed soldiers and officers from Pyotr Wrangel’s army came to Bulgaria, along with civilian refugees. In 1922, the Committee on Russian Refugees was established. Some refugees were offered jobs in the state administration, others received free medical treatment. There was a duty-free import of humanitarian aid from international organisations (Kisiova 2002). The coalition governing Bulgaria between 1923 and 1930 established the “Golden Age” of Russian immigration (Kisiova 2002). Each year, the Bulgarian state provided 11 to 12 million leva from the budget, which constituted more than two-thirds of the support for the needy Russian migrants. When the Parliament approved the allocation of lifetime allowances to some 50 veterans from the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War, it created a precedent in the history of Russian migration around the world (Kisiova 2002). Russian schools thrived, and so did the overall conditions for maintaining a Russian identity. Russians became the most favoured minority in Bulgaria (Kisiova 2002).

Germany’s assault on Russia in 1941 radically split the Russian community. Some of its members sided with Germany: 2,000 men enlisted in the “Russian Security Corps”, which was part of the German army. Others became actively involved in the communist resistance. The majority, however, remained politically neutral (Kisiova 2002).
The subsequent communist regime overhauled their policies: 22 out of 26 Russian organisations were disbanded and had their property confiscated. In 1946, the Ministry of the Interior established a department called "Whites". The stricter political control made many migrants adopt Soviet or Bulgarian citizenship. In the mid-1950s, the new Soviet citizens were allowed to return to the USSR and take part in the development of agriculture. 5,000 Russians went back to their homeland; another 7,500 chose to remain in Bulgaria (Kisiova 2002).

**The third wave (after 1944): Communist migrations - from ideologisation to sentimentalisation**

The communist regime after World War II witnessed a considerable change in the profile of Russian migration. The new migrants were mostly members of mixed marriages, which had taken place while Bulgarian specialists studied or worked in the USSR.

I would distinguish between two lines of interpretation. The first one was drawn by the regime, which viewed everything through an ideological prism. This led to family migration becoming an embodiment of Bulgarian-Soviet comradeship.

I refer to the second line of interpretation as sentimentalisation: Both Russians and Bulgarians from mixed marriages appropriated the "authorship" over defining family migration and overturned its meaning, distancing it from ideology and bringing it closer to identity, affection and love. This interpretative alchemy resembles a scene from George Orwell’s 1984: The protagonist listens to an ordinary woman singing a song composed by a machine. The song eventually begins to sound human and genuine, and the protagonist understands that there is hope, and change will come from below. Thus, the stories told by Russian women replace ideology with affection and identity:

*My home is Bulgaria. When my plane from Russia lands here, I can feel this tickle under my chin .... I don’t know the reason: Maybe it was the people who accepted me so warmly, maybe it was me – I came here out of love, on my own .... I’ve come to live here.*

(Krasteva 2014: 460)

Another illustration of this existential affective perspective is the transformation of female identities:

*In Russia, everything is borne by women. History has made it so: Our men have been killed, decimated in several wars in a row, starting at the end of the 19th century. Women had to plow, give birth, build, reconstruct .... In Russia, women look after themselves. Here in Bulgaria, it’s the opposite.*

(Krasteva 2014: 459)

This excerpt from an interview with a Russian woman married to a Bulgarian for about 20 years demonstrates the contrasting experiences of femininity. In both countries, women are emancipated, professionally and socially. Bulgarian women have strived to establish and solidify gender equality, whereas Russian history has frequently put women in the difficult position to face hardships on their own and raise their children as single mothers. The shared responsibilities in a family and the supporting shoulder of a strong and caring husband are among the advantages of living in a Bulgarian environment.

**The fourth wave (after 1990): Post-communist transnationalism – Russians as investors or invaders**

The democratic changes in the early 1990s brought in a new, different wave. A lot of Russians bought housing properties, especially along the sea. A considerable part of this wave exhibits the spirit of transnationalism: Russians do not settle here, but continue to live in Russia and take their vacations in Bulgaria; children, grandparents and family members with fewer professional commitments stay longer.

Once again, narratives fly in opposite directions. The first one is economics-tinted and presents Russians as some of the largest foreign investors in Bulgaria. The second one is politicised and paints them as a “fifth column,” invaders who take over through financial acquisition. Interestingly, this narrative can be heard in opposite quarters: Both from Russophobe public figures in Bulgaria (Indjev 2016) and from Russian politicians. Pyotr Tolstoy, a Russian MP, declared that the Russians are going to “buy” Bulgaria – and, according to him, already bought half of the coast (Капитал/Capital 2016).

This fourth wave also features a new phenomenon - lifestyle migrants. These are Russians settling in Bulgaria because of its mild climate combined with a similar culture and language, which facilitate and accelerate integration. Atypical cases are young retirees, looking for a healthier living environment after
completing their professional career. They do not merely avoid the polar interpretations of investors versus invaders; they build bridges between the Russian community and Bulgarian society, sometimes through strong symbolic gestures: “Together with Russian friends, we donated blood as an expression of gratitude for the hospitality” (Offnews 14.03.16). Among the heavily politicised communist and post-communist discourse, which hates or loves Russia with a passion and transfers these political preferences to the Russian community in Bulgaria, migrant agency has chosen to transform cultural similarities into a potent symbolic resource for openness, inclusion and building bridges.

Three portraits – Three integration strategies

- **The White**: Ivan was one of the Whites who found refuge in Bulgaria after the Bolshevik revolution. He lived modestly and inconspicuously and managed to hide his difference. He completely blended in with his surroundings: No Russian traditions, not a word of the language, whispered or entrusted to children and grandchildren, almost no tales about that other homeland in the family memory.

- **The Russian lady**: She was a dignified woman with an air of spirituality and culture. She was also an incredibly strong person: She lost her Bulgarian husband on their way to Bulgaria and arrived here alone with her four children, whom she proceeded to raise entirely on her own. Everything around her was extraordinary: Her children were two pairs of twins born on the same day, four years apart. She never made an effort to lose her Russian accent; on the contrary, it emphasised the appeal of the unique Russian environment she created around herself. Russian was the only language spoken at home, also for the Bulgarian members of the large family.

- **The migrant woman**: She married her Bulgarian husband during their studies in the USSR. At home with their three children, they spoke both Russian and Bulgarian. Today, the elder son lives in the U.S., the daughter lives in Belgium and the younger son is in Sofia.

Three identification strategies can be distinguished. The first is assimilation. Voluntary and systematic, it permeates everything: School, your children study your native language as a foreign language, you speak like the locals, and by and by start feeling like one of them. When talking to his brother, who said, “we Russians,” Ivan responded with “we Bulgarians.” This strategy is most common when the past has been traumatic. You do not wish to remember; therefore, you make it so that there is nothing to remember.

The second strategy preserves and even reinforces the identity. Everything about the Russian women was Russian. From addressing people by their first and second names, to the cultural atmosphere imbued with music and literature, to the reverence for the Russian language. This Russian-ness was so powerful and appealing that it generated reverse integration: It attracted members of the national majority to join the micro-circle of the Russian family community.

The third situation is the classical hybrid identity of the migrant: You are in between the native and the host culture, where you belong equally to both: “They’re both my home. I cherish Bulgaria and Russia in equal measure – as nations and countries alike” (Krasteva 2014: 455). This hybrid nature paves the straightest road to cosmopolitanism, to seeing other places, even the entire world, as a living space; hence, one son is in the U.S., the daughter is in Belgium and the other son is in Bulgaria.

Conclusions or the unfinished battle between politics and culture

Culture and politics play different roles in the micro-strategies of integration of the migrants themselves and in the political discourses and integration policies of the governmental elites.

On the one hand, culture prevails in the micro-strategies of migrant agency. They occupy a broad spectrum, from voluntary assimilation to hybrid Russo-Bulgarian identities. Yet all of them lie within the boundaries of inclusion and integration. Post-communist transnationalism is a new phenomenon, and we are yet to see whether it will reinforce or re-examine these boundaries.

On the other hand, in the interactions between politics and culture, politics always wins. The cultural similarities – Slavic languages, Orthodox faith, Cyril-
lic alphabet – have not influenced or dampened the abrupt political transitions. The Communist authorities created the “Whites department” at the Ministry of the Interior and shut down Russian organisations, radically redefining the state policies towards Russian migrants from humanitarian and integrationist to securitarian. Post-communism, just as radically, rejected “Bulgarian-Soviet comradeship” and tagged Russian investors as invaders.

Cultural proximity is less valued by politics than by migrant agency. Even during the communist period when relations between Bulgaria and the former USSR were the closest, the reasons were less connected to the Slavic, but rather to the communist international solidarity. Other elements of the cultural closeness – the Orthodox religion – have been conspicuously ignored and marginalised. Migrants are the crucial agency which cherishes the shared cultural capital. The alchemy of integration consists in the almost magic result that despite the political discourses fluctuating from admiration to accusation, the micro-strategies of integration of most Russians in Bulgaria are successful in building intercultural bridges.

Footnotes
1 Debates are usually about whether the monument should be dismantled and relocated or preserved.

2 All data are from the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute.

3 All interviews and portraits are from the author’s fieldwork.

4 The names are pseudonyms.

References


Introduction

Research on the integration of migrants in Hungary is often conducted on either one country of origin, one group of migrants (based on ethnicity, etc.) and/or on one historical period. Consequently, we have little comparative knowledge on how the historically evolving migratory spaces have integrated various groups. Moreover, we lack proper and systematic comparisons in the above aspects to test and to see what integration mechanisms exist for various groups in the same migratory space and to check whether ethnically-, linguistically- and historically-linked immigrant groups follow much faster and successful integration trajectories compared to the more “distant” groups.

Therefore, the analysis of the integration of historically- and ethnically-related groups is very complex.

There are various mechanisms leading to integration problems and exclusion (Lucassen et al. 2006; Kovács & Melegh 2007). Ethnic or cultural identity can, on the one hand, be denied by the host communities. On the other hand, migrant groups may also face numerous challenges in becoming integrated in the labour market because educational records are not acknowledged, they are discriminated against, there is a mismatch between skills they have and what the labour market demands, or they form a diaspora identity and become isolated from the host society even in the varying institutional contexts (Brubaker 1998, Gödri 2010, Joppke 2005, Feinschmidt & Zakariás 2010).

In terms of historical migratory links, Hungary shares a lot of similarities with other East European countries, but, simultaneously, it also represents a special case. Hungary is not an extreme case of a country in
need of human and labour resources, but it increasingly faces demographic challenges. This includes a possible loss of more than 2 million people, out of a total population of 10 million, if current migration and fertility trends are maintained (Földházi et al. 2014). Partially as a reaction, the country has developed a rather sophisticated system of preferential treatment for people with historical and ethnic ties. Since 2011, this has included granting Hungarian citizenship to applicants (even those living outside the country) with Hungarian or non-Hungarian ancestors who lived in the historical territory of the Hungarian Kingdom (which was divided up after the First World War). Thus many of these “new citizens” can enter the country as Hungarian citizens.

What do we know about the structural integration (access to labour market, level of education and access to citizenship) of the migrants with Hungarian background? In this contribution, this question will be examined by analysing integration in the context of the legal and institutional systems, as well as with regard to the discursive environment. This will first show how the public perceives the different incoming groups and what expectations they have. Second, it will illustrate whether ethnically-closed groups are able to use this advantage during the process of integration.

Eastern European countries (all countries of the former Eastern Bloc, excluding Russia and ex-Soviet Union Republics beyond the Black Sea) are mainly sending areas, while immigration is mostly characterised by migrants with historical and ethnic ties from neighbouring countries. This immigrant stock, nonetheless, is considerably smaller than the emigrant numbers in the region. In 2015, according to UN statistics (United Nations 2015), based on country of birth, there were slightly more than 10 million immigrants (those living in countries different from the country of birth), as opposed to 25 million emigrants from the region. The importance of intraregional immigrants is not only relevant in terms of numbers. It is symbolically relevant in public discourses as they represent links to territories “lost” during historical changes to borders during the 20th century.

Despite these discrepancies, according to the Eurobarometer survey (European Commission 2016), the majority of respondents in the region have a negative perception of migration. When asked about what the most important issue is facing Europe, East European countries are among the ones where respondents are the most worried about migration and terrorism. In a 2016 survey conducted in Hungary and Romania, 63% of the respondents in Hungary agreed that the number of immigrants should be reduced – and in more than 50% of the cases, respondents agreed that it should be reduced substantially.

### Institutional and discursive environment

When looking at the different levels of integration, it is also important to look at the institutional environment and discursive frameworks (the patterns in which migration is discussed in various forms of media or in the public opinion) as they provide the immediate social context of immigration.

Hungarian migration and population policy can be understood as a hierarchical and selective system based on an idea of demographic nationalism (Melegh 2016). This means a combination of selective migration regulations, state-sponsored pronatalism and the overall policy aim of promoting “Hungarian resources” in population development, and the “survival” and the “rise” of a small nation in the context of global competition. The most preferred immigrant group is the one with Hungarian origin, born mainly in neighbouring countries (e.g. in Romania, Serbia, Slovakia or Ukraine), but linked to the historic territories of the Hungarian Kingdom (Melegh 2016). This, however, does not satisfy Joppke’s distinction between settler, colonial or diaspora type of ethnic migration generally used in the case of “ethnic migration”, since it is the result of historical border changes and not migration as such (Joppke 2005). This institutionally supported group is seen as the closest group, the one most preferred by the local population in addition to being seen as a resource in the competition.

Beyond the ethnic-historical, nation-building process using citizenship linkages, the country institutionally supports the free movement of people within the EU and fully respects the Schengen agreement. As compared to the previous groups (ethnically- and historico-linked Hungarians and European Economic Area (EEA) citizens), for the last two decades, Hungary has followed a much harder and non-supportive
policy toward Third Country Nationals (TCNs, non-EEA) of non-Hungarian origin in terms of naturalisation and any form of institutional help.

In the previous 10-15 years, various public discourses could be identified concerning migration issues based on the complex analysis of press materials, legal texts and public statements (Melegh 2016, Hegyesi & Melegh 2003). First, there is a dominant nationalist discourse, highlighting the importance of the symbolic “reunification” of the nation across borders, building the Hungarian nation and the connection between all Hungarians even across borders in order to avoid treating them as “migrants”. There is also a liberal discourse formulated around following an imagined humanitarian “West” in fighting against the “racism” of the majority, against discrimination and for equality, the extension of human rights, multiple identities and the use of migrant labour. The third major type of discourse focuses on social exclusion in order to defend jobs and social security, and pension opportunities of the “inborn” people as opposed to incoming groups (even Hungarians coming from neighbouring countries). The fourth type of discourse is securitisation, which has similarities with the discourse focusing on social exclusion, but here the emphasis is on national or “European” security threatened by illegal migrants.

These observed discourses, in almost all elements, point towards the exclusion of “distant” groups. Even historically- and ethnically-tied groups can be seen as risks for the local population in certain discourses (Feischmidt & Zakariás 2010). However, they are also targeted by strong positive discourses of cross-border nation-building. According to questions measuring social distance in a survey carried out in 2016 by the Minority Studies Institute of the Social Science Centre at the Hungarian Academy of Science, the Hungarian public views different Hungarian groups from neighbouring countries (Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine) as very close to “Hungarians” (from Hungary) (see Figure 1).\(^3\) Meanwhile, based on answers in the same survey, migrant groups and refugees were seen as being distant from any kind of ethnic Hungarian groups.

### Indicators of integration

The institutional and discursive framework positively discriminates in favour of historically- and ethnically-close groups. Is this advantage reflected in the successful integration of these groups? To answer this question, we will focus on some key indicators like employment, education and citizenship (Asselin, Dureau, Fonseca, et al. 2006).

We carry out this analysis on immigrants from neighbouring countries (more than 65% of all residents born outside the country) and immigrants from China and Vietnam, as they are the largest group of immigrants from outside Europe. Here we analyse separately individuals with Hungarian language competences (proxy for ethnically- and historically-linked groups) and those without such competences, and according to the date of arrival.

In 2016, among the foreign-born population between the age of 25-64, almost two-thirds only spoke Hungarian, which shows that Hungary has mainly attracted immigrants who already had knowledge of the Hungarian language.\(^4\) In the case of immigrants coming from neighbouring countries (Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine), this was more than three-quarters. This shows that a large proportion of immigrants have great advantages since language is not a barrier for them. Thus, their integration was not hindered by the use of “poor” Hungarian or no Hungarian at all.
Citizenship

The knowledge of Hungarian and the institutionally provided advantages clearly appear in another aspect of integration, namely naturalisation. As mentioned above, since 2011, for the immigrants ethnically- and historically-linked to Hungary (living and not living in Hungary), the access to Hungarian citizenship is very easy and they receive plenty of institutional support, even in the bureaucratic process itself. Other immigrant groups residing in Hungary face much harder conditions when trying to become naturalised. In interviews with such individuals, they complain about administrative difficulties even after residing and working in Hungary for a long period of time. Previously, this complaint was just the other way around: Immigrants ethnically- and historically-linked to Hungary had a more difficult time (Melegh 2011). This institutional support is evident in the fact that in 2016, among residing people born in Romania, Serbia and Ukraine, more than 85% had Hungarian citizenship, which could also be dual citizenship.

The only exception where high rates of naturalisation are not observed is Slovakia. This is likely because the Slovakian government is very restrictive about dual citizenship. In the case of more “distant” groups outside Europe, this ratio is below 40-45%. In the case of those coming from Asia, it is below 15%. This suggests that the integration process was slowed down due to administrative obstacles in Hungary, the choice of migrants and the influence of sending communities (by not allowing dual citizenship for instance).

Employment levels

In 2016, on average, working-age immigrants (between the age of 15 and 64) coming from major migration sending countries showed higher levels of employment than the population born in Hungary, with the exception of those coming from Ukraine, which had a somewhat smaller level of employment. Thus, we can argue that residing immigrants from the selected countries represented “gains” in terms of employment if a utilitarian approach is used.

Education levels

In terms of education level, non-Hungarian speakers have, on average, higher levels of education in comparison to those who speak the language: Almost 50% of those not speaking Hungarian had higher education levels compared to 30% of those speaking Hungarian (Figure 3).
This “advantage” of non-Hungarians (almost 50% had higher education as opposed to foreign-born Hungarians with around 30%) varies according to countries of origin (Figure 4). The “advantage”, however, disappears if we observe the people who arrived more than 10 years before (in the case of the migratory link between Serbia and Hungary for instance, where the relevant ratio is a little bit above 20%).

If we link the observations that are based on educational level to language and date of arrival, and even employment (Figure 2 and Figure 4), then we can see that, overall, those individuals with a lower level of education that arrived more than ten years ago have higher levels of employment, particularly non-Hungarian speakers. Those not speaking Hungarian who have not resided in Hungary for more than ten years show an opposite pattern, namely that they have relatively high levels of education, but lower levels of employment. This might indicate that integration can be uneven among the ones not speaking the local language and that “closeness” makes integration more secure in all relevant aspects.

Nonetheless, this statistical picture can be due to various factors. Either this is a question of historical change in the migratory patterns (the social composition changes and less qualified individuals migrate as Hungary becomes less attractive). Or it can be explained by the fact that only those remain in the country who are willing to give up the opportunities and benefits from having a high level of education and settle for jobs they are overqualified for, and thus a selection process continues. It could also be that the stock of recent immigrants contains a large number of students who eventually leave Hungary when higher education degrees are completed. Or it can be the combination of various mechanisms. In any case, further analysis is necessary.

By using logistic regression models, which show causal mechanisms, we demonstrated that the odds of being integrated into the labour force (to be employed) is positively affected by educational level, the status of being foreign-born and one’s knowledge of the Hungarian language. Moreover, by keeping education level, Hungarian knowledge, period of stay in Hungary under statistical control, the foreign-born population in general, but especially from China, Romania and Vietnam, have much higher odds of being integrated into the labour force. Of course, there exist various integration mechanisms; however, the logistic regression model demonstrates that the integration of migrant groups in Hungary has no obstacles in terms of the labour force, regardless of cultural closeness (Gödri 2017).

Conclusion

Partially as a “self-fulfilling prophecy”, closeness and institutional support provide higher levels of integration in some institutional aspects, like access to...
citizenship, but it does not mean that other groups do not or cannot achieve high levels of integration. There is no overall rule that “closeness” makes integration easier and more balanced in the crude social indicators of integration. It seems that a longer length of stay in the country can go together with relatively high employment levels among non-Hungarian speakers, while such high levels cannot be observed among those staying only for a shorter period of time.

The opposite can be observed in terms of educational levels. This can be due to the fact that those staying less than ten years are young people who study or have just finished their studies (therefore, they are also not employed at high levels). The ones who stay longer are the ones with a lower education. If this is the case, then Hungary loses certain potential. But surely this can also be due to other factors like historical changes (what varying “demand” for incoming people appears in certain periods of social development, like the need for unskilled labour). Or there can be change regarding how and why Hungary is chosen. For example, mainly students from Vietnam first came in the 1980s and 1990s and then later, the immigrants became employees of entrepreneurs coming from China (Várhalmi 2017). It is clear that historical links with certain countries and groups have their own history and that country-specific factors also play a role.

Overall, when thinking about the integration of migrants “close” to Hungary, we have to do a complex analysis that takes into account historical structural factors and the several aspects of integration, which include such subtle factors like the rivalry and exclusion toward ethnically-linked groups in various contexts (Feischmidt 2004). This explains, even in the integration of “identical” people, that there is a need to have such policy and opportunity structures which allow them to find links to the host society.

Footnotes

1 According to the 2016 Microcensus in Hungary, the foreign-born population of 15-64-year-olds consisted of 272,525 people. Among them, 43.5% were born in Romania, 6.4% in Serbia, 6.6% in Slovakia and 9.3% in Ukraine.

2 This research was conducted by the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities and Migration Research Institute in 2016 (unpublished research report compiled by RIRNM). Hungary and Eastern Europe have always responded more negatively than Western Europe in various comparative survey analysis. For similar tendencies in 2002, see Avramov (2008).

3 The question and the scale used in the survey was: To what measure do you like or dislike the members of the following social groups? (Scale: 1 – I don’t like at all ... 5 – I like absolutely). The research did not differentiate among certain migrants groups; only generally formulated terms for different items were used for “refugees” and “migrants”.

4, 6, 7 Own calculation with data from Microcensus 2016.

5 On the impact of dual citizenship on ethnic Hungarians’ minority identity and the role of the Hungarian state in offering Hungarian citizenship, see Papp (2017).

8 This is a historical tendency as similar patterns could be observed in 2011 when those were analysed who came between 2001 and 2011. See Melegh and Sárosi (2015).

9 Gödri (2017) observed similar mechanisms in the 2011 census (namely that citizenship, time of arrival and knowledge of Hungarian language has a positive impact on labour market status based on a multivariate regression analysis) and even drew attention to gender aspects, namely that the above mechanisms are less obvious in the case of men.

10 Gödri and Kiss (2009) observed that Hungary remained attractive only for lower class Hungarians in Romania.

References


The End of Fraternity?

Twenty-Seven Years After the Collapse of the Soviet Union – Xenophobia in Russia

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• Police statistics show an increasing proportion of registered committed crimes against foreigners and stateless persons in Russia.

• However, since the successful election of the ruling party’s candidate, Sergey Sobyanin, and the increasing importance of neighbourhood policies (e.g. Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)) for Russia, the strong, articulated, official Russian nationalism lost its significance.

• Strengthening of patriotism and the efforts by the national government to rally the support of the Russian population and to set the agenda is based no longer on the fight against “illegal migration”, but to a large extent is based on the external “enemy” images and the “encirclement” of the country by NATO.

• Some data suggest, that among others, the use of anti-extremism laws has enabled Russian state authorities to fight the racially motivated attacks and hate crimes. However, there is a lack of reliable official statistics and (representative) scientific studies, calling for a further clarification and improvement of the data situation.

• Several authors argue that the life of migrants seems to be characterised by frequent cases of discrimination, their vulnerability to extortion by the state authorities and their obligation to make bribery payments.

Introduction

According to the United Nations (UN) International Migration Report 2015, the number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly over the past 15 years, reaching 244 million in 2015, which is up from 222 million in 2010, 191 million in 2005 and 173 million in 2000 (United Nations 2015). Since 2000, Russia hosts 12 million international migrants permanently and ranks 3rd, after the USA and Germany, in the international statistics on total stock of international immigrants.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of 15 new independent states, Russia has become a centre of migration from the peripheral regions of the former Soviet Union (Mukomel 2005:13). The increased immigration to Russia in the 1990s was characterised by the inflows of mostly ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers from the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. Since the beginning of the new millennium, Russia has experienced a decrease in immigration of Russians and Russian-speakers, but an increase in the immigration of migrants with only basic or no command of Russian. Poletayev (2014: 8) identified a growing cultural distance in the religious and linguistic aspect of incoming migrants in Russia in the recent years compared to the 1990s.

According to the 2010 census data, more than 195 different ethnicities were living in Russia – 67 more in Russia compared to the last Soviet census data from 1989.1

“Fraternity of people” – a concept of a natural broth-
erhood of all workers, which would make the idea of separate nations obsolete – was a designated goal of the Soviet government. Lurye (2011) states that at the very basis of the Soviet concept of “fraternity of people”, there was an ideology of internationalism: “As a result, the Soviet people had to represent an ideal of internationalism, that is, not to form a single nation, but to remain a formation of nations” (Lurye 2011: 148). Yet already ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the media coverage on inter-ethnic relations in Russia was dominated by xenophobic headlines.²

Thus, the questions posed in this contribution are how xenophobia and discrimination have developed over the recent years, and how internal policies and the paradigm changes of foreign policy impact public opinion on migrants and the level of discrimination and racially motivated attacks on migrants in Russia. This article, via a review of existing survey data, statistics and anti-extremism legislation, will outline the situation in the country. It offers an insight on discrimination and xenophobia in Russia and on the action taken by the Russian government to fight xenophobia and discrimination against migrants.

This chapter is specifically tailored to the overarching thematic framework of inclusion and exclusion of migrant communities sharing similar cultural backgrounds with their host societies. In the elaboration of this contribution, the author took into consideration that Russia is a multi-ethnic country, with at least 200 different nationalities having been counted in the last census in 2010, and that there are data problems regarding the experience of xenophobia by internal migrants in Russia (e.g. from the north Caucasus region). The author acknowledges that this topic is of vast scientific importance and deserves to be expanded upon in standalone articles and studies. Due to the emphasis on the experiences of international migrants, it was not possible to also include the perspective of the internal migrants in the present chapter.

**Immigration to Russia after the collapse of the former Soviet Union**

In the past two decades, the yearly total net migration (difference between the number of immigrants and emigrants) to Russia has been consistently positive. Most of the migrants arriving to Russia were from the new successor states of the former Soviet Union. Up until 2006, the migration flows from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have undoubtedly overcompensated for the otherwise overall negative net migration rate of Russia (Figure 1).

The first years after the break-up of the former Soviet Union were marked in Russia by a major influx of international migrants from the former Soviet Republics, followed by a period where migration levelled off from 2001-2006 and again began to increase in 2007. However, the rising numbers of international net migration since 2007 have not reached the same levels of the 1990s. Simultaneously, the ethnic composition of migration flows from the CIS have undergone a substantial transformation (Figure 2).

Until 2004, the ethnic composition of migrants from the CIS was characterised by Russians and Russian speakers, especially from Kazakhstan. From 2005 onwards, the ethnic composition diversified due to the arrival of migrants from Central Asia and the South Caucasus, with basic, or in many cases, no command of Russian. Until 2014, migrants from Uzbekistan were the major group of immigrants arriving to Russia. The start of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 was a clear push factor for many Ukrainians to leave the country and move to Russia. The changes in procedure and the increased cost for obtaining labour permits led to a negative net migration rate with Uzbekistan in 2015, the first time since 1997.
According to official statistics from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the overall positive net migration has been accompanied in Russia by an increase in the number of registered committed crimes against international migrants: From 0.4% of the total number of registered crimes in 2003 up to 0.7% in 2017 (Figure 3). Unfortunately, there is no publicly available itemisation on the kind of committed crimes against foreign citizens and stateless persons.

Official statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs offer no differentiation based on ethnicity and/or nationality of attacked persons. Therefore, it is very difficult to make any reliable statement about the question which groups are the most vulnerable. Furthermore, there is a clear limitation of the official crime statistics, which provide basically no statistics on the reality of crime, but statistics on the activities of the police forces. The incompleteness of the crime statistics is often caused by underreporting of known crimes, not recording all known crime, selective law enforcement, unwillingness of the public to report crime and changes in the law. The official statistics also do not provide a distinction between the type of committed crimes against foreign citizens and stateless persons. A closer examination of the proportion of committed crimes against foreign citizens and stateless persons given by the official statistics could create the feeling that they could be artificially predefined, since the numbers remained the same for several years.

There is a clear lack of statistical data on racially motivated attacks in Russia. Founded in 2002, the Moscow-based, Russian non-profit organisation, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) conducting research, monitoring and collecting information on nationalism and racism on a daily basis. However, the source of information needs to be criticised: The Center depends mostly on reported crimes in the daily newspapers, which are ambiguously labelled as committed hate crimes. The organisation maintains a database of registered cases on murder and beatings of migrants and visible minorities. Notwithstanding, the data offers an insight in the development of racially motivated attacks and hate crime in Russia for the time period since 2007 – a year where the number of registered hate crimes and racially motivated attacks peaked (Figure 4 and also retraceable in Figure 3).
The number of registered homicides decreased from 103 in 2008 to one in 2017. Likewise, the number of registered beatings went from 354 in 2007 to 19 in 2017. The strong decrease in the registered number of beatings and homicides over the years shows a clear dependence on the number of sentences imposed by courts for hate crimes and racially motivated attacks (Figure 4). The annual yearbooks of the SOVA Center show that in the second half of 2008 and in 2009, the largest and most aggressive far-right groups in the Moscow region were disbanded by law enforcement authorities, causing “the apparent reduction in the number of victims for the first time in six years” (SOVA 2009: 5), which continued to decrease in the following years. A legitimate and unanswered question that still remains is: Is the improvement in the numbers of registered, committed hate crimes due to the government’s action or due to a underreporting of those crimes in the media?

The election of Moscow’s mayor and the public’s opinion on migrants

The slight increase in beatings and homicides in 2012-2013 (Figure 4) is possibly attributable to the election of Moscow’s mayor in the summer of 2013 and the preceding election campaign, which was dominated by the topics of nationalism and “fighting of illegal immigration”. Sergey Sobyanin was appointed Mayor by Dimitry Medvedev in 2010 after Yury Luzhkov’s removal from office, who was not due to face election until 2015. Saikkonen (2015) highlights that “while his direct election would help to legitimize Sobyanin’s position, there was also a strategic aspect of the timing. The scheduling of the important Moscow executive elections in 2015, only several months before the 2016 State Duma elections, could have risked opposition coalescence in one of the most important regions in the country.” (Saikkonen 2015: 12-13)

Abashin (2014: 28 f.) addressed that all six candidates’ campaigns focused on the threats and dangers of international migration and migrants in Russia, using in their debates images of Central Asian and Caucasian migrants. He also argued that the discussion about the social aspects of migration, even without the racist hints of the candidates themselves, created a wave of openly racist statements in the media and on the Internet, seemingly legitimated by a political discussion on migration (Abashin 2014: 29-30). Abashin highlighted that the elections became a catalyst for a growth of anti-migrant opinion.

Since 2004, the Russian public opinion Levada-Center has conducted a series of representative surveys on attitudes towards migrants. The percentage of respondents who answered in the affirmative to the question of whether the residency of individuals from the following nations should be limited in Russia rose significantly during the election campaign of 2013 (Figure 5) and decreased in 2014 after the successful election of Sobyanin in September 2013.

Levada-Center analyst Pipiya (2016) argues that the significant decrease in the negative stance towards the foreigners and migrants from 2014 onwards is due to an absence of a strongly articulated, official, Russian nationalism as seen in the elections campaigns. Pipiya (2016) highlights further that the decrease in the negative stance towards foreigners and migrants is also due to a lack of a “grassroots nationalism, which has been taken under the strict control of anti-extremism legislation” and due to a minimisation of the transfer of xenophobic ideas into the masses and its “implantation” in public opinion by the media.

Another possible explanation could be the paradigm change of the Russian neighbourhood policy. Since the successful election of the ruling party’s candidate Sobyanin and the increasing importance of the neighbourhood policies (e.g. Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU)) for Russia, the strongly articulated, official, Russian nationalism lost its significance. The negative headlines on xenophobia in Russia are counterproductive when it comes to expanding Russia’s influence in the region and bond the former Soviet Republics – donors to the labour migration to Russia and beneficiaries of high remittances of migrants – closely to itself. Besides the founding countries, the EEU consists of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and now Armenia (on 2 January 2015) and Kyrgyzstan (on 6 August 2015). In the case of the Ukraine, the pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych decided to abandon an association agreement with the European Union and pursue exclusive integration with the EEU. This was the key factor, which led to the Euromaidan protests, followed by the outbreak of the Crimean Crisis and imposition of sanctions on Russia. Thus, strengthening of patriotism and the efforts by the government to rally the support of the population and set the agenda is based no longer on the fight against the “illegal migration”, but on the external enemy images and the encirclement of the country by NATO.

Discrimination of migrants on an everyday basis and the need for further development of anti-discrimination legislation

The legal basis for the state’s action against hate crimes and racially motivated attacks is provided by the Constitution, Criminal Code and the Administrative Offences Code. Article 19.2 of the Russian constitution guarantees equal rights and freedom to all individuals, regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, property and official status, place of residence, religion, convictions, membership to public associations, and other circumstances. All forms of limitations on human rights on social, racial, national, linguistic or religious grounds shall be banned. The Criminal Code and the Administrative Offences Code of the Russian Federation contain several anti-extremism articles which partly foresee very high sentences. Stringent implementation of these legal sources allow the Russian authorities to have an impact on the level of attacks and racial hate crimes, and the paradigm shift in the Russian neighbourhood policies is an incentive for this. The everyday life of migrants, though, still seems to be characterised by discrimination. Several authors highlighted the situations of discrimination and exploitation migrants face on the labour and housing markets, and their vulnerability for extortion by the state authorities and their obligation of bribery payments for gaining access to necessary labour and residence permits (Chupik 2014; Deminzeva et al. 2014; Lokshin et al. 2013; Reeves 2013; Solovyeva et al. 2011; Bezborodova et al. 2011).

By adoption of several laws on 1 January 2015, the regulation on labour activity have been simplified for migrants from the countries of the former Soviet Union, which enjoy a visa-free entrance regime with Russia. The quota mechanism for limited labour allowances and the labour patent system have been consolidated to just a labour patent system, which, contrary to the former procedure, can now be directly purchased by every migrant and allow them to work for every employer. The adoption of these laws could be considered as an endeavour by the Russian government to take control of corruption and informal trading with allowances. However, the field of anti-discrimination legislation in Russia is relatively underdeveloped (EITC). Thus, in 2003, article 136 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation introduced the definition of discrimination. Yet, this legislation needs further elaboration and development,
since the article, for example, does not explain the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination. The first step in this direction was the signing of the federal law 162 on 2 July 2013, which banned the inclusion of discriminatory requirements in job advertisements. Federal law 162 forbids employers to indicate any restrictions on sex, age, attitude to religion, place of residence, marital status and nationality in their vacancies. And the further development of Russian anti-discrimination legislation could be based on the valuable experience of and in cooperation with its’ European neighbouring countries. The lack of new data makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of this policy and calls for a further investigation of this topic.

Conclusions

As shown in this contribution, several political decisions and a stringent implementation of the available legal basis in Russia seem to have positively impacted the decrease of racially motivated attacks and hate crimes against migrants in Russia. However, lack of reliable official statistics and (representative) scientific studies calls for a further clarification and improvement of the data situation in the field in order to validate this probable improvement for migrants in their everyday life in Russia. Furthermore, several authors argue that the life of migrants is still characterised by frequent cases of discrimination, vulnerability to extortion by state authorities and their obligation to make bribery payments for gaining access to necessary labour allowances and residence permits. Simplification of the regulation on labour activity of migrants in Russia on 1 January 2015 is a significant step towards the containment of corruption and increasing the predictability of life for migrants from the successor States of the former Soviet Union in Russia. However, the anti-discrimination legislation in Russia is at a very early stage and needs further elaboration.

Footnotes


4 Discrimination, that is, violation of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of man and citizen based on gender, race, nationality, language, origin, property or official status, place or residence, attitude to religion, convictions, or affiliation with public associations or any social groups, made by a person through the use of the official position thereof shall be punishable with a fine in the amount of 100 thousand to 300 thousand roubles, or in the amount of a wage/salary or any other income of the convicted person for a period of one year to two years, or by deprivation of the right to hold specified offices or engage in specified activities for a term of up to five years, or by obligatory labour for a term of up to four hundred and eighty hours, or by corrective labour for a term of up to two years, or by deprivation of liberty for the same term.

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Introduction

This contribution discusses the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 as one of the largest refugee-producing moments in the global history of 20th century nation-building (Alexander et al. 2016). The partition led to the homelessness of millions of Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims on both sides of the border (Roy & Bhatia 2008). While newly-formed national and religious boundaries between India and Pakistan witnessed an exodus of approximately 15 million refugees, thousands lost their lives. Thousands of women were abducted, raped and forced to convert to Islam, Hinduism or Sikhism, depending on the religion of their abductors. The abduction and conversion of women aimed at increasing the demographic strength of either country, characterised the partition as biological warfare between emergent religious nationalism in 1947 (Das 1995). While the Indian and Pakistani governments rescued abducted women from both sides of the border, their Hindu and Sikh pre-partition families rejected these women, considering them "impure". Children born out of this biological warfare were considered products of the "enemy" and largely abandoned (Butalia 1993; Das 2006). The partition, especially for women and children, was perilous (Menon and Bhasin 1998) and transformative (Tan & Kudaisya 2000): A catastrophe that transformed the postcolonial Indian psyche into becoming migratory (Nandy 2007).

My research describes the history of emotions associated with partition migration in North India, focussing specifically on refugees in India after 1947, and I base my arguments on the theoretical outline of "Emotional Communities" by Barbara Rosenwein (2010: 1-32). Rosenwein situates the history of emotions as emerging between self-defined communities (like families) and historical change within these, impacted by emotions. Rosenwein deconstructs biological perspectives about emotions, while refusing to give undue primacy to currently-experienced emotions. Instead, she identifies emotions as historical agents that impact and transform community identity over time.

Applying Rosenwein’s theory of emotional communities to the partition and refugees in India after 1947, one observes the formation of a three-layered emotional community originating from India’s nationalist struggle. While Indian anti-colonial movement inhabited one layer, the political demand for a separate Muslim nation (Pakistan) and separate religions (Muslim for Pakistan and Hindu for India), the partition and ensuing religious nationalism formed the second mutually conflicting layer. This ambivalence characterises the partition between India and Pakistan as a liminal movement that overlapped with the uncertainty of British withdrawal from India and the euphoria of independence (Iob 2018). While the first anti-colonial layer witnessed unity between Muslims and Hindus against the British, this was over-ridden by the second layer that witnessed division between Muslim (Pakistani) nationalism and Hindu (Indian) nationalism.

These two conflicting layers were further complicated by territorial divisions that constituted the third layer of India’s emotional community. The linguistically united Punjabi community was internally bonded due to their common vernacular expressions and regional customs (Mir 2010), but partition led to conflicts between Muslim Punjabis, Hindu Punjabis and Sikhs over commonly owned territories and the question of Punjab’s belonging to India and Pakistan. Indeed, as Iob describes (2018: 13-44), religious communities in the Punjab attempted to maximise territorial control in the months before the partition through violence. Hindus and Muslims sought to eliminate each other in every village to conquer as much territory on their side of the border. They fought each other not just for nationalism or religion, but for control over their villages and vernacular micro-regions. Partition therefore ruptured all three layers of India’s emotional community (national, religious and vernacular) as refugees from opposite sides of the border rushed to its “right” side.
Muslims who stayed behind in India and Hindus who stayed behind in Pakistan were considered “minorities” and treated like hostages by both countries. Anti-Hindu minority violence in Pakistan was reciprocated by anti-Muslim minority violence in India (Talbot 2006). Sikh-Hindu refugees were viewed as upholders of Indian nationalism, as their arrival from across the border supported the idea of Hindu-India against a Muslim-Pakistan. The heroism ascribed to Sikh-Hindu refugees became gradually associated with their entitlement to gain new material prosperity in India, as stories of their courage were accompanied by their representation as victims.

For example, this advertisement from the Times of India dated December 1947, encouraged Indians to help refugees materially, while portraying Sikhs (in the forefront of the long caravan) as leaders. Refugee heroism intensified hatred against Muslim minorities in India (Talbot 2006) and their residential areas were ghettoised and dubbed “mini-Pakistan” (Zamindar 2007) to mark refugee entitlement over these spaces, since refugee homes in Pakistan had been taken by Muslims.

Emotional responses to refugees in India after 1947

Emotional responses to refugees were heterogeneous, impacting the formation of various complex emotional communities in postcolonial India. In this discussion, I highlight six emotional responses to partition that altered the postcolonial history of refugees.

The first emotional response criticised refugees for spreading partition violence within “peaceful” Indian society, especially in places that had not undergone partition or witnessed rioting. Feminist scholarship on refugee violence has also outlined how refugees murdered women from their own family to prevent their abduction by Muslims (Butalia 1998). This image of the violent refugee was likened to the spreading contagion of partition, as refugee struggles for financial stability were ascribed to greed (Talbot & Tatla 2006). This emotional response led to the emergence of anti-refugee and anti-North India politics in vernacular regions outside the partition zone (like Maharashtra), where refugees demanded resettlement (Purandare 2012). This growing antipathy towards refugees was sharply criticised by Gandhi, who urged host society members to accept them (Akbar 2003).

The second emotional response, somewhat associated with the first, challenged refugees for their claimed entitlement to prosperity. This challenge was publicly articulated through displays of “pity”. Pity, thinly-veiled as refugee antipathy, humiliated refugees and deprived them from rightful material gain in India. Pity produced refugees at the mercy of host-society charity. This advertisement from December 1947 (Times of India (Bombay) - see next page), for example, demonstrates the public pity projected on impoverished refugees. The political veneer of this advertisement is noteworthy, since the price of the folding bed in question (Rs. 35) was relatively expensive for 1947 in India.

The third emotional response, associated with the first two, likened Sikh-Hindu refugees with Muslim minorities in India, reducing them both to their common Pakistan connection. While Sikh-Hindu refugees had lost homes in Pakistan and carried nostalgic memories, Muslim minorities in India were associated with the exodus to lost Hindu homes in Pakistan. Refugees and Muslims became symbols of the partition and of Pakistan that reduced the purity of the
Hindu nation (Zamindar 2007), as both refugees and Muslims were considered Pakistani at heart. Sikh-Hindu refugees and Muslim minorities also belonged to the same vernacular region in North India and shared languages like Hindustani and Punjabi. Their similarity with one another produced competitive violence between them. Refugees attacked Muslims to occupy Muslim neighbourhoods in “mini-Pakistan” that compensated for their losses in Pakistan and simultaneously demonstrated Indian-ness (Zamindar 2007: 79-119). Hindu nationalism that blamed Muslim minorities for refugee woes led to the gradual internalisation of anti-Muslim violence as a valid form of Indian integration (Pandey 2001).

The fourth emotional response to partition segregated Hindu Punjabi refugees from Sikh refugees. Sikh refugees who had once united with Hindu refugees against Muslims and Pakistanis separated ways violently as they competed for resources. Hindu refugees seeking to integrate with other Hindu Indians derided Sikhs as ridiculous, violent and uncivilized. As the public domain in India overflowed with anti-Sikh humour, the Sikhs implored the Indian Supreme Court in March 2017 to implement a legal prohibition on anti-Sikh jokes that offended their religious sentiments. While Sikhs expressed disappointment at their exclusion within Hindu society, they asserted their religious self-determination through the Khalistan movement (Kinnvall 2006), as Hindu refugees sought to integrate with other North Indian Hindus by joining religious-political groups like the Arya Samaj that endorsed Hindu revivalism (Thursby 1975).

The fifth emotional response to partition and refugees was first expressed by the British, and later inherited by elite Indians. Since the British and other elites escaped partition violence when crossing the border by taking expensive flights and ship journeys, their emotional response to partition claimed to “not understand” religious nationalism and its ensuing violence. While this claim of “not understanding” was aimed at preserving the first anti-colonial emotional layer of the Indian community that had once united Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims against the British, it also demarcated elite political positioning in post-partition India as important agents of Indian secularism. Furthermore, the emotional response of not “understanding” originated from personal and family disconnection with the displacement and violence of partition, and reflected commonly-held British emotions of “not understanding” religious nationalism, despite colonial discourse embodying nation-building, and their policies of governance through “divide and rule” in India (Khan 2007). In the cartoon below, published by the Times of India (Bombay) in October 1947, two British women express dismay about the partition and separating neighbours, while sitting in a movie theatre.

The final sixth emotional response to partition highlights refugee “silence”. This silence is contextualised within emotions of not finding a united voice or establishing a fourth layer of India’s emotional community. Instead, refugees became fragmented as their infighting religious groups competed for resources. While this infighting characterised refugees as violently competitive about others, it also highlighted their patriarchal oppression of women within their own micro-groups. Feminist scholarship (Butalia 1998; 1993; 2010) has explored the resulting silence of refugee women, unable to challenge in-group patriarchal violence, since this would result in their excommunication. While Hindu refugees became woven into the emotional fabric of postcolonial Hindu-Indian nationalism, they became fragmented from Sikh refugees, who had also supported Hindu-India in 1947. The emotional isolation, oppression and silence of refugee women within fragmented Hindu and Sikh groups have been likened to a drone of unresolved emotions: Shame, confusion and trauma (Chakravarti 1994; Das 2006). While the silence of refugee women symbolised the national trauma of the Indian partition, it is also marked partition with revulsion and associated it with the horror
of violence (Kristeva 1941).

Conclusion: Theoretical underpinnings and internal linkages

I have so far outlined six emotional responses to the formation of a triple-layered emotional community in India that impacted the history of partition refugees, creating smaller and competitive micro-groups that segregated Hindus from Sikhs, and refugee men from refugee women. While these splits produced by government irresponsibility towards refugees and minorities perpetuated colonial policies of “divide and rule”, it blamed refugees for host society difficulties. Further, it blamed Muslim minorities for refugee difficulties, Sikh refugees and Hindu refugees for each other’s difficulties and male refugees for the oppression of female refugees. Ensuing infighting between these already fragmented groups was justified as a form of righteous honour that allegedly explained violence: Refugee honour for supporting Hindu-Indian nationalism, Sikh honour as leaders of the partition exodus, Hindu honour for establishing religious-majority nationalism, and the masculine honour of instituting ethnic purity. Based on Ranajit Guha’s (2012) debate on Indian history that can be considered relevant only when invoking the moral value invested in writing world history more meaningfully, I will end this article by applying some of the already explored problems of Indian refugees in 1947 to the general question of refugee exclusion.

It becomes evident for example that imagining refugees as monolithic and as the same-culture groups (Punjabis, Hindus, Indian and men) confounds the issue of integration. Not all Punjabis could integrate across national and religious boundar-ies after partition, and neither did men and women refugees share the same experiences of embodying ethnic honour, and its related validation of violence against those who were accused of threatening its purity. Neither was the host society monolithic. Within newly independent Hindu India, there were Muslim minorities as well as other Hindu regions that had neither undergone territorial division nor migration. These regional groups and minorities contested refugee pride and honour. Partition refugees in India also did not receive much government support.

Being unable to accommodate millions of refugees, the Indian government assumed specific tasks like establishing temporary camps and retrieving abducted women. They left the resettlement of refugees largely to a civil society that lacked the partition experience, despite sharing similar cultural backgrounds. Other refugees and disempowered members of host society were so financially insecure that they also competed with refugees. There were millions of refugees in India between 1946 and 1948 who were unable to find work and resettlement. Their competitiveness against other more successful refugees expressed itself in allying with underprivileged members of the host society. Left alone without government support or civil society empathy, refugees and disempowered members of the host society organised into tighter religious and ethnic groups that struggled for financial stability and nationalist belonging by claiming purity and honour. Women, who could not complain against government apathy or men from their own ethnic kin group that governed community interests, were silenced with the partition, as their task became relegated to upholding the honour and purity of their community.

What we learn in general about refugees on a global
scale from the partition example can be better posed as questions:

- Would government support reduce refugee exclusion, mitigating their fragmentation into smaller, competitive and hard line groups?
- Would enabling refugee financial stability constitute a constructive path towards solving problems encountered within refugee integration?
- Would civil society empathy about the migration experience (irrespective of cultural difference/similarity) alleviate distrust against refugees?
- Would educating refugees about notions of upholding community honour and purity help them integrate better?

References


Conclusions

Reflections on Culture as a Driver of Inclusion (To Be Continued)

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Cultural divergence, insufficient language skills and knowledge of the norms and values of the country of destination, as well as pronounced religious otherness are often considered as one of the main obstacles to successful integration of immigrants. However, this discussion paper showed that even under “optimal” conditions with regard to the categories mentioned above, i.e. bilingualism or even the same mother tongue, shared cultural traditions and narratives, as well as same religious beliefs, the pathway to inclusion is not necessarily any smoother.

Three different scenarios have been taken into regard: Migrants originating from “broken” communities after a dissolution of the political entity where they were living for centuries; the situation of immigrants in multi-ethnic communities who share some cultural traditions with the majority of the population in the country of destination due to their common colonial past; and societies where ethnic diversity has been a less pronounced obstacle on the way to integration due to an overarching concept of social cohesion, such as the socialist notion of transnational solidarity within the “working class”.

Regarding the first group, the example of ethnic Germans, who arrived as expellees in the residual territories of Germany after the Second World War, is particularly striking. They were often welcomed by their fellow countrymen with strong resentment and some often faced discrimination. As Soňa Miku-lová pointed out, even religion did not always help to unite both groups during the first years after arrival. In the churches of the same denomination, the “otherness” of the refugees in terms of liturgical practices caused tensions with the existing parishes. As Pascal Maeder discovered from oral history interviews with German expellees who moved to Germany after leaving eastern European countries or those who moved to Canada, discrimination happened in both countries, independent of cultural similarity (or dissimilarity). Still, ethnic Germans were able to renegotiate their identities after migration. The cultural context provided in the country one migrated to shaped the framework conditions for it. In the case of Hungary, evidence from population data presented by Attila Melegh and Attila Papp Z. showed that the political support for immigration and naturalisation of individuals who were born within the boundaries of the former Kingdom of Hungary effectively did not disadvantage other immigrant groups in terms of integration (such as Vietnamese immigrants), where a longer stay in the country and better educational attainment also mattered. Furthermore, “co-ethnic” immigrants could be exposed to discrimination, too. Deepra Dandekar focused on the drivers of segregation among the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh population in the former Punjab province of British India, which after the independence of 1947 was partitioned among the two successor states India and Pakistan. Here again, in an even more dramatic way, the partition of India and Pakistan produced violence and barbarism between religious groups, despite previously belonging to the same British Indian Empire. Applying the concept of “emotional communities”, her contribution highlighted that we can gain a deeper understanding of the conflict lines, the emotional responses and the traumatic experience caused by the separation.

The second group of case studies referred to the experience of post-colonial migration to states in Europe with a strong imperial legacy, namely the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Portugal. As Laurence Lessard-Phillips showed in the United Kingdom, immigrants from the “Commonwealth”
increasingly became subject to distinction along the lines of ancestry and “partiality”, namely ethnicity and even race. This especially provided “white” immigrants from the so-called “Old Commonwealth States” (Australia, Canada and New Zealand) advantages in the process of integration. Even if language proficiency, when tested, facilitated the access to education and the labour market, inequalities among the Commonwealth immigrants were still persistent. In France, as Tatiana Eremenko pointed out, ethnic categorisations, such as in the United Kingdom, did not exist, at least not in the official data. Proficiency in French, as well as cultural entanglements and transnational networks between former colonies and France, encouraged migration towards the metropole, and also after arrival facilitated the pathway towards integration. However, discrimination still took place and continues, particularly towards immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa who have worse outcomes with regard to integration in comparison to other immigrant groups. The development in Spain, as laid out by Andreu Domingo i Valls, is a different case insofar as it was characterised more by “positive discrimination” of Latin American immigrants, following a “pan-Spanish” ideology since the times of Franco, but also in reaction to labour force shortages. On the one hand, preferences for Latin Americans had negative effects on the integration chances of immigrants from other countries and particularly Morocco; on the other hand, this did not automatically mean that the privileged could overcome disadvantages in comparison to Spanish natives, e.g. with regard to access to jobs equivalent to their qualification and upward social mobility. Furthermore, there are also considerable differentiations within the Latin American immigrant groups, which led to discrimination, e.g. based on racial characteristics. In the case of Brazilian immigrants to Portugal, João Sardinha drew attention to another important factor beyond shared language and cultural backgrounds, which has a strong impact on integration pathways, namely stereotypes, such as the clichés about typical “characteristics” of an immigrant population. Such prejudices reduced the access of Brazilians to special branches of the labour market, and the line between connotations of immigrants as “exotic”, active discrimination and transgressive behaviour is blurred.

The cases of Bulgaria and Russia are particularly interesting since during the communist period, discrimination based on ethnic diversity was not an appropriate feature of the policy discourse due to the overarching idea of “socialist brotherhood” within the Soviet hegemony. It is therefore more interesting to see what happened when this factor was diminished after 1989. As Anna Krasteva pointed out, in the interactions between politics and culture, politics always wins in the conception and implementation of integration policies. The cultural similarities have not softened or dampened the abrupt political transitions from the humanitarian treatment of Russian refugees after the First World War to privileged reception during the communist period and to hostile discourse in the current post-communist period. The case of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union introduced by Paul Becker shows that there have been waves of discrimination and hate crimes against non-Russian populations that require further explanation. Nevertheless, one can see that the idea of the socialist “brotherhood of people” had not survived the political environment it was born in. However, as far as one can see from the scarce reliable data, it matters how the issue of ethnic discrimination and hate crimes has been treated within political campaigns, in the media, by political leadership, by state legislation and in crime prosecution.

By retracing the journey to integration for various immigrant groups who share basic cultural patterns with the receiving countries, the authors of this discussion paper highlighted that in most cases “culture” is only used as an analogy for “foreignness”, i.e. much less an objective pattern, but a subjective perception within the public discourse of the country of destination. As some authors suggest, the role of political agenda setting within the public discourse needs to be considered more. Policies are twofold: They can decisively counteract discriminatory incitements and hate crimes, or they can also support agitation against immigrants, both passively and actively. On the one side, they may pursue an inclusive strategy, promoting supranational concepts such as the “socialist brotherhood” or the invention of a “greater” national community, which also includes those living abroad, but considered ethnically, culturally or linguistically similar into the own community. On the other side, policies provide a framework defining who are the “foreigners” and “undesirables”. This concept can be continuously shifted to other (new) immigrant groups.

With a focus on the native population in the country of destination, it seems that despite the arguments of cultural diversity, fears of losing privileged
access to socio-economic resources and particularly advantages in the labour market play an important role in discriminatory attitudes. This does not only apply to poorly developed regions or socially disadvantaged groups. Anticipated fear of social decline and threats of one’s own social status is often the root of resentment – even if individuals’ living conditions may have considerably improved over the last decades. Not surprisingly, strong anti-migrant resentments also appear in regions which either do not face any immigration at all, or are exposed to socio-economic issues caused by causes other than migrants. Populist campaigns can also not be forgotten, which use alienation and social discrimination as an easy argument to sell themselves as advocates of the disregarded.

There are also some inconsistencies with regard to what actually constitutes cultural identity. Arguments referring to the concept of “the West”, “the Occident”, “Europe”, or “Christianity”, often completely disregard that in the process of historical evolution in most of the European countries, ethnic, cultural and religious plurality has evolved – but not uniformity. In some countries which were formed by two or more ethnicities, there is not even consensus about what language should be predominately spoken. As authors pointed out, neither immigrant nor the native population in the host countries can be seen as monolithic, and this especially refers to cultural identities; not to forget that there are also strong variations according to ethnic backgrounds and gender preferences in the host countries, as well as, within the migrant communities.

Finally, patience may sometimes matter: Many articles showed that integration of culturally diverse, but also homogenous populations takes time, sometimes 10 years, sometimes even a generation. As shown for the German migrants, some were heavily discriminated after they arrived, but after a few decades, they had completely assimilated. Still, time as an argument needs to be discussed as we see that some disparities may be reproduced across generations, especially when we think about the experience of “visible” ethnic groups, for instance in the labour market.

Generally speaking, most countries have gained from waves of immigration since they have existed, and immigration waves are quite common throughout history for any country, as some authors mentioned. In any case, this discussion paper makes a strong case that cultural diversity as an argument should be used more carefully, and more research has to be done on the issue to better understand what in fact supports exclusion vs. inclusion and how cultural diversity can be weighed against those factors. The Max Planck Society’s research initiative on migration and integration is currently underway to explore the drivers and mechanisms, the actors and agencies, as well as the obstacles of exclusion. One of the take-home messages from this discussion paper could be: Similarities between migrants and natives do not imply a smooth integration into hosts societies. Consequently, cultural distance as an obstacle towards successful integration of immigrants should be revised as a political argument, and tackled with responsibility in words and deeds.
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